Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements by Mallinder, Louise
Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements
Mallinder, L. (2019). Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements. (PA-X Report: Transitional Justice Series).
Edinburgh: Global Justice Academy, University of Edinburgh.
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
Copyright 2019 Edinburgh Law School. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any
applicable terms of use of the publisher.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:05. Apr. 2019
Louise Mallinder
Amnesties and Inclusive
Political Settlements
PA-X REPORT: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE SERIES
Author: Louise Mallinder
Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP)
Global Justice Academy 
School of Law
Old College
The University of Edinburgh 
South Bridge
Edinburgh
EH8 9YL
Tel. +44 (0)131 651 4566
Fax. +44 (0)131 650 2005
E-mail: PoliticalSettlements@ed.ac.uk
www.politicalsettlements.org
@PolSettlements
Acknowledgements: This report is an output from the Transitional 
Justice Institute for the Political Settlements Research Programme, 
funded by UK Aid from the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. 
However, the views expressed and information contained in it are 
not necessarily those of, or endorsed by DFID, which can accept no 
responsibility for such views or information or for any reliance placed 
on them. Any use of this work should acknowledge the author and 
the Political Settlements Research Programme. For online use, we ask 
readers to link to the original resource on the PSRP website.
Earlier versions of the database received funding from the Northern 
Ireland Department of Education and Learning and the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council. 
Earlier versions of this work were presented at the Institute for 
Integrated Transitions Law and Peace Practice Group meeting and a 
seminar hosted by Oxford Transitional Research Network. The author 
would like to thank the participants in those discussions for their 
feedback. Cover images: Robert Henderson and Amber Brown. All 
images are subject to copyright.
©2018
Executive Summary   01
Introduction 06
Part I:
What do existing cross-national
studies tell us about the use and
effects of amnesties during conflict
and peace     09
Part II: 
Introducing the amnesties, conflict 
and peace agreements (ACPA) dataset 19
Part III: 
General trends in the ACPA data   22
Part IV: 
Amnesty design during conflict 
and peace        30
Part V: 
Amnesties and inclusive 
political settlements       60
Conclusion     76
Resources   77
References   78
Contents
About the Author
Louise Mallinder is a Professor of Law at Queen’s University Belfast. Professor Mallinder 
has conducted extensive research on amnesty laws, including fieldwork in Northern Ireland, 
Uganda, South Africa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Uruguay, and Argentina and leading the expert 
group that produced The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability. 
Her monograph, Amnesties, Human Rights, and Political Transitions was awarded the 
2009 Hart SLSA Early Career Award and was jointly awarded the 2009 British Society of 
Criminology Book Prize. She is a member of the Institute for Integrated Transition’s Law 
and Peace Practice Group and Chair of the Committee on the Administration of Justice, a 
human rights non-governmental organization in Northern Ireland.
Abstract
This report draws on the new Amnesties, Conflict, and Peace Agreement (ACPA) dataset, 
developed through the Political Settlement Research Programme, to explore when and 
how amnesties are used during conflict and peace. In particular, it uses the empirical data 
from its large-scale comparative of analysis of amnesty practice to examine how the 
context in which amnesties are adopted can shape decisions on the scope, conditionality, 
and legal effects of amnesties. The report argues that these aspects of amnesty design can 
have significant implications for the extent to which amnesty can contribute to inclusive 
political settlements or conversely to excluding some individuals or groups from the 
post-conflict political contract.
Executive Summary 
This research report explores when and how amnesties are used during conflict and 
transitions towards peace. In particular, it examines how the context in which amnesties 
are adopted can shape decisions on whether to limit the material or personal scope of 
amnesties or to attach conditions to the grant of amnesty; or on their range of legal effects. 
The report argues that these aspects of amnesty design can have significant implications 
for the extent to which amnesty can contribute to inclusive political settlements or 
conversely to excluding some individuals or groups from the post-conflict political contract.
The report draws on the new Amnesties, Conflict, and Peace Agreement (ACPA) dataset 
to conduct a large-scale comparative analysis of trends in state practice on conflict and 
peace-related amnesties. The findings of this report contribute significantly to the fledgling 
literature on the role of amnesties in resolving armed conflicts by documenting and 
analysing the specific forms and functions of amnesties enacted during conflict and peace 
and exploring how they are tied to the negotiation and implementation of peace processes.
Findings
] Amnesties are widely used in response to conflict and peace negotiations. For example,  
 over 75 per cent of amnesties adopted since 1990 related to conflict. In addition,   
 over 49 per cent of comprehensive peace agreements adopted in the same period   
 provided for amnesty, and 83 per cent of peace agreement amnesty commitments   
 were implemented. 
] There is a consensus in existing literature drawn from large-N comparative studies   
 that amnesties introduced as part of negotiated peace settlements are likely to have a  
 positive effect on the sustainability of peace. However, within this broad consensus,   
 there are different views on the extent that context and amnesty design shape   
 the ability of the amnesty to contribute to peace.
] Context matters: the phase of the state’s journey from the conflict to peace and the   
 nature of the governing regime affect the likelihood that an amnesty will be introduced.  
 For example, fewer amnesties are granted in democratic states than mixed or   
 authoritarian regimes. In addition, amnesties are used most often during ongoing   
 armed conflicts, when no negotiations are in sight. Amnesties are used less often in   
 pre-negotiation stages of a peace process before increasing in frequency as a peace   
 process advances.
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] There is considerable diversity in the design of amnesties during conflict and   
 peace, which may affect an amnesty’s legality, legitimacy and capacity to contribute  
 to sustainable peace. This diversity reflects decisions on whether the amnesty should
 be limited or broad, conditional or unconditional, and generous or punitive in its   
 legal effects. However, previous database research on amnesties has only made
 tentative steps towards exploring diversity in amnesty design. In particular, although  
 the legal effects of an amnesty can shape the extent to which it is intended to foster  
 greater inclusion, no previous study has systematically explored this aspect of 
 amnesty design.
] 22 per cent of amnesties included in the dataset grant immunity for international   
 crimes (i.e. genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious human rights
  violations). In contrast, 23 per cent of amnesties identified exclude international crimes.  
 Taken together, less than half of the amnesties in the dataset relate to international   
 crimes. Political offences are by far the most commonly amnestied category of   
 crime. This suggests that although much of the literature on amnesties focuses on   
 whether amnesties can cover international crimes, the issue is not relevant for almost  
 half of the amnesties in the sample.
] The context in which an amnesty is introduced may affect whether it is limited 
 to exclude international crimes. Amnesties for international crimes are included in   
 higher proportions in pre-negotiation and post-agreement phases. In the
 pre-negotiation phase, states may grant such amnesties where they need incentives 
 to persuade non-state actors to enter into negotiations. In contrast, in the post-  
 agreement phase, they may reflect a backlash against the onset of criminal   
 investigations and trials. In contrast, amnesties that exclude international crimes 
 are less prevalent during ongoing conflict than in comprehensive peace agreements.   
 In addition, the report found that free and partly free states are more likely to exclude  
 international crimes than include them, whereas authoritarian states are more likely 
 to grant amnesties for international crimes.
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] Members of non-state armed groups are most likely to benefit from conflict-related   
 amnesties. This trend holds true for all phases from conflict to peace. In contrast,   
 state actors benefited from 72 of the 289 amnesties in the dataset and of these only  
 14 applied exclusively to state actors. State actors are included in a greater proportion  
 of amnesties when a peace agreement has been reached and they are included in 43  
 per cent of amnesties in the post-agreement period. This perhaps reflects that during 
 the conflict, state actors faced little prospect of criminal accountability; however, as   
 the former regime is forced to share power with or even relinquish power to its
 opponents, state actors may begin to feel more exposed to criminal liability and 
 may demand amnesty to protect themselves.
] Conditional amnesties are most often used to ensure that rebels end their insurgency.  
 The most commonly occurring conditions are those that seek to ensure that   
 combatants disarm, renounce violence, and refrain from recidivism. Less common are  
 conditions that offer direct benefit to victims, such as, requirements that combatants  
 disclose the truth about their actions, contribute to reparations, or participate in 
 alternative justice mechanisms. This could be because the state’s ability to attach   
 conditions may reflect the balance of power in the negotiations. Conditions that 
 impose greater costs on amnesty beneficiaries in terms of potential tarnishing of   
 individual reputations and/or the legitimacy of their armed struggle are more likely
 to be resisted by the intended beneficiaries of the amnesty.
] Only 37 per cent of the amnesties in the dataset were unconditional, but state actors  
 are more likely to benefit from unconditional amnesties than non-state armed groups.  
 Unconditional amnesties are more likely as a peace process becomes established,   
 with 56 per cent of amnesties that result from peace agreements and 61 per cent 
 of post-conflict amnesties being unconditional. They are more likely to be introduced  
 by partly free or unfree regimes than democracies. Unconditional amnesties are also  
 more likely when the amnesty benefits state actors. Given that unconditional 
 amnesties for combatants are likely to result in greater impunity, than amnesties that  
 require beneficiaries to engage with the peace process and contribute to truth and   
 reparations, this data suggests that risk of impunity increases where amnesties extend 
 to state actors.
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] The legal effects of amnesties tend to become more generous to amnesty beneficiaries  
 in the later stages of the negotiations and peace process. In particular, prisoner   
 releases and sentence reductions become more likely after the pre-negotiation phase. 
 This incremental growth in generosity could be due to multiple factors including state  
 unwillingness to appear weak while conflict is ongoing or a growth in trust between   
 the parties as the negotiations develop. It is unsurprising that in the post-conflict   
 period, stopping ongoing trials is the most common legal effect of an amnesty given  
 that it is the onset or expansion of criminal trials at these points that most often 
 triggers amnesties in these contexts. Amnesties that expunge criminal records are also  
 most prevalent in the post-conflict period; this could reflect that during this period, the  
 ways in which criminal records can create barriers to integration become more visible.
] Amnesty design can shape the extent to which an amnesty can foster inclusion and   
 exclusion. This is a complex relationship and one amnesty process can simultaneously  
 seek to include some groups within the political settlement, whilst excluding others.   
 Key design choices with respect to inclusion relate to limitations in the crimes covered  
 by the amnesty, conditionality, and legal effects.
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Recommendations
Policymakers, international donors, and conflict mediators should:
1. Move away from assessing amnesties solely on their material scope and instead, base  
 assessments of the legality, legitimacy and feasibility of amnesty based on the full   
 range of amnesty design features reviewed in this report, such as which categories of  
 persons and crimes are covered by an amnesty; the types of conditions attached to an  
 amnesty; and an amnesty’s legal effects.
2. Ensure, as far as possible, that where amnesties are granted to combatants that they  
 are not standalone measures but are instead tied into broader peace processes.
3. Exercise vigilance in the post-conflict period as amnesties enacted in this period are   
 among those offering the broadest impunity. Similarly, the risk of broader impunity   
 rises when amnesty benefits state actors.
The report further recommends that researchers should:
1. Investigate further the impact of amnesties during conflict and peace. In doing so,   
 they should ensure that measures of impact used are appropriate to the context and
 form of amnesties being assessed. As this report has made clear, amnesties introduced  
 during conflict and peace are not homogenous and therefore using one measure of   
 impact, such as conflict termination, for all forms of amnesty is not appropriate. In   
 addition, assessments of the impact of amnesties should seek to explore how amnesty  
 design choices support or undermine reductions in conflict intensity, conflict 
 termination, or sustainable peace.
2. Explore some of the gaps in knowledge that this report has highlighted, for example:
 ] The role and impact of amnesties for less serious offences;
 ] The higher rates of amnesties for state actors in mixed or partly free regimes; and
 ] The linkages between amnesties for state actors and the lower rate of conditions  
  that are attached.
Introduction 
Amnesties are widely used in response to conflict and peace negotiations. For example, 
over 75 per cent of amnesties adopted since 1990 related to conflict (see Section 4 below 
for a discussion of these trends) and over 49 per cent of comprehensive peace agreements 
adopted in the same period provided for amnesty.1 Their prevalence indicates that states and 
other actors view amnesties as useful in getting opposing factions to the table, brokering 
compromises in agreements, and encouraging combatants to lay down their weapons. 
Despite the frequency with which amnesties are used, since the late 1990s, an 
accountability norm has developed within international law and policy that seeks to 
prohibit amnesties for international crimes and serious human rights violations. However, 
this should not be interpreted as a complete rejection of amnesties. For example, the UN 
continues to recognize the importance of amnesties for resolving civil wars, as shown in its 
2012 Guidance for Effective Mediation, which states that although UN mediators: 
 …cannot endorse peace agreements that provide for amnesties for genocide, crimes against  
 humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights, including sexual and gender-based  
 violence; amnesties for other crimes and for political offences, such as treason or rebellion, 
 may be considered – and are often encouraged – in situations of non-international armed   
	 conflict.	(UN	Mediation	Support	Unit,	2012,	p.	17,	emphasis	added).
This passage speaks to the tensions that exist in the use of amnesties today. On the one 
hand, their legality is contested when they seek to cover international crimes and serious 
human rights violations. On the other hand, international actors such as the UN and many 
states around the world continue to enact and support at least certain forms of amnesties 
as part of conflict resolution. Furthermore, international human rights courts have indicated 
that they might be inclined to look favourably on amnesties emerging from negotiated 
agreements, even where they extend to serious violations, provided that the amnesty is 
part of a broader process to achieve peace and reconciliation and is conditional on some 
form of sanctions being applied to the beneficiaries.2
1
 This figure has been obtained from the PA-X Peace Agreements Database, available at https://www.
peaceagreements.org/ (accessed 19 June 2018). In contrast, only 15 per cent of comprehensive agreements had 
provisions relating to judicial accountability before national or international courts.
2
 See, for example, the Concurring Opinion of Judge García-Sayán, I/A Court H.R., in the case of the Massacres of El 
Mozote and nearby places v El Salvador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 25 October 2012. Series C No 
252. See also Ould Dah v France App no 13113/03 (ECtHR, 17 March 2009); Margus v Croatia [GC] App no 4455/10 
(ECtHR, 27 May 2014), para. 139.
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As a result of these tensions and the legal ambiguity on amnesties, they have been 
described as a ‘flash point’ between conflict mediators and human rights advocates 
(Licklider, 2008, p. 382). Such critiques argue that these communities of scholars and 
practitioners have diverging positions on whether amnesties for international crimes are 
legally permissible and/or politically expedient. However, as this report demonstrates, less 
than half of the amnesties used during conflict and peace relate to international crimes. 
Conflict-related amnesties that are unrelated to international crimes are less likely to 
conflict with states’ international legal obligations, and as such, are less likely to be a 
‘flash point’ between mediation and human rights communities. As much of the existing 
academic and policy literature on amnesty asks when amnesties are illegal, the low 
prevalence of amnesties for international crimes points to the value in now identifying 
points of convergence on the forms of amnesties that are legally permissible and likely to 
have a positive impact on transitions from conflict. As Section 2 below explores, this issue 
is particularly timely given that recent research indicates that amnesties may be more 
successful in resolving armed conflict, where they are limited to exclude international 
crimes and serious human rights violations (Dancy, 2018).
Most existing academic writing amnesties focuses on whether amnesties breach states’ 
international obligations to prosecute and punish. There has been limited academic 
literature on the role of amnesties in resolving armed conflicts. As a result, there are 
considerable gaps in existing knowledge. In particular, as Section 2 explores, existing 
database research on amnesties has only made tentative steps towards exploring diversity 
in amnesty design. The Amnesty, Conflict and Peace Agreement (ACPA) dataset 3  that 
provides the underpinning data for this report, significantly advances our understandings 
of when and how different forms of amnesty are used through a coding and analysing 
rich comparative data on amnesty design. The design of the dataset enables the data 
to be disaggregated so that, for example, the prevalence of particular types of amnesty 
conditions can be explored. 
3
 The ACPA dataset is a subset of data from the Amnesty Law Database. The Amnesty Law Database, created 
by Mallinder, currently contains detailed profiles of 651 amnesties enacted between 1945 and 2016. For more 
information on this database, see Section 3 and Mallinder (2008).
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It also contains information on aspects of amnesty design that have not previously been 
subjected to academic scrutiny such as their range of potential legal effects and the 
mechanisms for implementing amnesties. In addition, the data captured paints a richer 
picture of how amnesties are used in response to conflict, as it is not limited to solely 
gathering data on amnesties for non-state armed groups. Finally, as the data extends up to 
2016, it provides a much more up-to-date analysis than previous studies. 
Through reviewing the findings of the ACPA dataset, this report reveals that considerable 
diversity exists in the design of amnesties during conflict and transitions towards peace, 
which it is inferred, may affect an amnesty’s legitimacy and capacity to contribute to 
sustainable peace, as well as its legality. The descriptive data provided in this report 
is useful for casting light on the range of design choices that may be available to 
those involved in mediating negotiations on amnesty or drafting amnesty legislation. 
Furthermore, this data can provide an empirical grounding for future research to conduct 
more finely grained analyses of the impact of different types of amnesty at different stages 
from conflict to peace.
The report begins in Section 2 by reviewing and summarising the findings of existing 
cross-national studies on the use and effects of amnesties during conflict and peace. 
Section 3 presents the dataset underpinning this report and explains how it differs in 
conceptualization, scope and forms of data collection from existing research. This dataset 
is used in Section 4 to present general trends on when and where amnesties are used 
in response to conflict, before Section 5 provides an overview of findings relating to 
specific aspects of amnesty design. Section 6 uses these findings, together with case study 
examples, to explore the complex relationship between amnesties and inclusive political 
settlements. Section 7 concludes by summarising the main findings and recommendations.
08  //  Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements
Part I: 
What do existing cross-national studies 
tell us about the use and effects of 
amnesties during conflict and peace?
Although states undergoing or moving away from conflict have, for centuries, routinely 
used amnesties, it is only in the last decade that a small body of scholarship has emerged 
to systematically investigate, using large-N cross-national studies, why states introduce 
amnesties and to assess whether they can help conflicted states move towards sustainable 
peace. These studies consistently show that amnesties are widely used as responses to 
armed conflict. In addition, they point to numerous issues that require further investigation 
such as how the timing of amnesty, the balance of power, and the prevalent system of 
government, can shape the use and forms of amnesty. The studies further make some 
observations on how aspects of amnesty design can shape their impact. However, for the 
most part, research has only made tentative steps towards unpacking these issues. The later 
sections of this report build on this existing literature by providing a more finely grained 
analysis of the different forms that amnesty can take at different temporal stages and 
exploring the implications that this can have for the achievement of inclusive peace. The 
remainder of this section briefly summarizes key themes and findings from the literature 
with respect to amnesty design, timing and context, and the impacts of amnesty on peace.
Amnesty design 
How datasets approach differences in amnesty design can significantly shape cases they 
include in the sample, their approach to coding amnesty data, and consequently, the findings 
they produce. In existing research, the issue of amnesty design arises predominantly, but 
often rather superficially, in how the concept of amnesty is understood for selecting cases for 
inclusion in the dataset. Considerable variation exists in how existing studies do this. These 
differences arise in part because there is no internationally accepted definition of amnesty 
laws and the practice of states on amnesties varies considerably (Mallinder, 2012, p.75). As a 
result, some studies conflate amnesties (i.e. measures granted pre-conviction) with pardons 
and sentence releases (i.e. measures granted post-conviction) (e.g. Reiter, 2014). Other 
studies base their analysis solely on peace agreement amnesty commitments regardless of 
whether these commitments were honoured (Melander, 2009), and others include amnesty 
offers in their sample regardless of whether the offer was ever implemented (Dancy, 2018). 
One study fails to offer any definition (Lie, Binningsbø and Gates, 2007).
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There are also considerable differences in how existing studies set criteria for including 
amnesties within the datasets based on specific elements of amnesty design. Often these 
criteria relate to the research questions the dataset is intended to answer. For example, 
in her analysis of the extent to which amnesties offer an incentive for rebels to disarm, 
Daniels (2016) only includes amnesties that extend to rebel leaders. Dancy’s (2018, p. 390) 
sample is similarly limited as he develops a bargaining theory of conflict and peace and as 
such he only includes amnesties if they protected members of rebel groups.4  In contrast, 
Loyle and Binningsbø’s (2016, p. 448) dataset captures data on amnesties for ‘(alleged) 
violators of human rights or domestic laws’, with no inclusion criteria relating to the 
affiliation of the amnesty beneficiaries; although, it should be noted that this dataset also 
contains a variable to disaggregate whether the amnesty benefitted state and/or non-state 
actors. These differences in conceptualization and operationalization, among others, mean 
that the existing large-N studies on amnesties are working from very different samples.
There are also differences in how far existing datasets are structured to capture and analyse 
disaggregated information on specific aspects of amnesty design. These differences can 
affect the extent to which existing datasets can produce findings on how particular design 
features result from specific contexts or can contribute to particular outcomes. Several 
studies treat amnesties or peace agreement amnesty commitments as homogeneous by 
coding simply for the presence or absence of amnesty, without taking into account the 
diverse forms that amnesties can take. Other studies disaggregate their data but do so 
merely by coding amnesties into broad categories. For example, rather than examining 
the different conditions that can be attached to amnesties, some existing studies code 
an amnesty as simply conditional or unconditional (see e.g. Loyle and Binningsbø, 2016; 
Daniels, 2016; Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster, 2012).
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4
 However, the author later observes that ‘of the 297 conflict amnesties since 1946, only seventy-seven (26%) [cover 
serious violations]. Far more amnesties release political prisoners of conscience, forgive rebels for crimes against the 
state, or aim to repatriate displaced individuals’ (p. 394). As not all political prisoners or displaced members would be 
members of rebel groups, it seems his sample may be broader than initially defined.
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Even relatively light touch disaggregation of data to reflect differences in amnesty design 
produces interesting findings. For example, the dataset used by Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates 
and Elster found that ‘most amnesties are granted unconditionally, particularly general 
amnesties granted as parts of peace agreements’ (2012, p. 735). They further found that 
‘post-conflict amnesties are frequently granted conditional on rebels giving up the armed 
fight’ (2012, p. 735). As section 5 explores, ACPA data does not agree with the specific 
observation made by Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster; however, it does agree that the 
timing of an amnesty can shape the extent to which conditions are attached.
Other scholars have found that amnesty design may also matter for the impact of an 
amnesty. In particular, Dancy significantly advances the literature by disaggregating 
amnesty data to explore how the material scope of an amnesty, together with contextual 
factors, can affect the impact of amnesties. He assesses impact based on (1) whether a 
conflict terminated within two years of the amnesty being granted (relying on data sets 
produced by the Uppsala Conflict to identify when a conflict terminates as a result of 
political negotiations) and (2) whether a conflict reoccurred following its termination. In 
his research, Dancy distinguished amnesties that offered immunity for atrocity crimes and 
serious human rights violations from other conflict-related amnesties (2018, p. 394).4  He 
found that ‘Amnesties’ post-termination pacifying effects are strong when they accompany 
a formal peace agreement, but absent in instances where the offer exculpates combatants 
for atrocity crimes and other serious violations of human rights’ (Dancy, 2018, p. 388). This 
finding indicates how more finely grained analysis of differences in amnesty design can 
help us to understand better the impact of amnesties.
5
 In Dancy’s study, ‘An amnesty is then coded as having immunities for serious violations if (1) it explicitly provided 
immunity for any of the acts listed here; (2) the amnesty provided a blanket immunity for all crimes committed 
during conflict; (3) the amnesty did not contain an exception for acts considered to be in violation of international 
law; or (4) the amnesty was worded in a legally ambivalent way that allowed groups to escape criminal prosecution 
for serious violations’ (2018, p. 394).
Notwithstanding these interesting findings, the literature to date has only made tentative 
efforts to understand the diversity of options in amnesty design, to explore how amnesty 
design is used differently at different points in the journey from conflict to peace, and to 
measure the extent to which particular design features can shape the impact of amnesty. 
As a result, several notable aspects of amnesty design, such as the range of possible of legal 
effects, have not previously been subject to academic scrutiny. The dataset that forms the 
basis of the analysis in the later sections of report is markedly different in that provides 
a much more detailed exploration of multiple aspects of amnesty design including the 
crimes and beneficiaries covered by the amnesty, the conditions that are attached, and the 
amnesty’s legal effects.
Timing, regime type, and balance of power
Amnesties are used during ongoing armed conflicts, as part of peace negotiations and 
agreements, and in post-conflict periods. At each of these temporal points, the amnesties 
may be used for differing objectives and consequently may be designed in different ways. 
Existing datasets have taken different approaches to the question of temporality. Some 
studies look only at amnesties enacted during ongoing armed conflicts, others only include 
post-conflict amnesties, and others analyse data on amnesties enacted during and after 
armed conflict. For each temporal stage, existing research has sought to use contextual 
factors such as the level of democratization or the balance of power to explain approaches 
to amnesty.
Within respect to the level of democratization, in a study on ‘during conflict justice’, which 
included amnesties, Loyle and Binningsbø observed that
 Regardless of how a country is ruled, all types of governments turn to pardoning 
 crimes at some point during an internal armed conflict. Together with purges, however,  
 amnesties are initiated more often in mixed regimes than in democracies. 
 (Loyle and Binningsbø, 2016, p. 453).
The system of government was also emphasized by Daniels, who found that democracies 
are less likely than authoritarian societies to offer unconditional/unlimited amnesties, 
which the author attributes to the reputational costs relating to such amnesties (2016, 
p. 45). As Section 5 explores, the ACPA dataset supports Daniels’ finding
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On the balance of power in ongoing conflict, Loyle and Binningsbø found that ‘where 
the balance of power favors the rebels, governments are more likely to use conciliatory 
strategies, such as amnesties, potentially in an attempt to signal a willingness to negotiate’ 
(2016, p. 458). Daniels went further in arguing that the balance of power may shape not 
just the decision to grant amnesty, but also the form that it takes: ‘[s]omewhat less strong 
rebels still have the leverage to get generous amnesties, but weaker groups receive strict 
amnesties’ (2016, p. 45).
Similar themes are evident in research findings relating to post-conflict amnesties. For 
example, Lie, Binningsbø and Gates found that ‘in those cases where conflicts end with 
victory, … amnesty and exile are not offered as a policy options in the majority of cases.’ 
(2007, p. 9). Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster took a different approach by observing 
that although amnesties are more common after bargained solutions to armed conflicts, 
‘High levels of amnesty after victories could be the result of the new leadership wanting 
to maintain the economic and political support of the old opposition’ (2012, p. 738). 
These authors furthered noted that ‘Civil wars … lead to more amnesties than less severe 
conflicts. These patterns seem to indicate that those in power after civil wars often forgo 
accountability processes to secure conflict termination’ (Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and 
Elster, 2012, p. 737).
The ACPA dataset explores timing and regime type issues by disaggregating the amnesties 
in the sample based on the timing of the introduction of the amnesty with respect to the 
conflict and peace process and by the type of regime that introduces the amnesty. Almost 
all of the cases in the sample relate to non-international armed conflicts.6  The dataset does 
not currently categorise the amnesty processes based on attributes of the conflict, such as 
their intensity, the level of internationalization of the fighting, or whether the conflict had 
other cross-border dimensions, or on the balance of power during the negotiations.
6
 Although, exceptions to this are amnesties resulting from the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s that at different 
points were international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts and contexts like South Africa where 
the amnesty covered the actions of members of the South African Defence Force within South Africa as well as their 
actions during conflicts in the wider southern Africa region.
Impact of amnesty on peace
Within the transitional justice field, there is an emerging literature on measuring the 
impact of transitional justice processes. The literature includes studies that explored the 
impact of amnesties on democratic consolidation and the promotion of human rights (see 
e.g. Olson, Payne and Reiter, 2010). However, such studies were not focused exclusively on 
amnesties related to conflict and peace – they instead included amnesties enacted as part 
of transitions from dictatorship. Where academic writings and policy papers have sought to 
measure the impact of amnesties introduced in response to armed conflict, they have done 
so only with respect to their impact on peace. To measure the impact on peace, existing 
studies used different measures, including shifts in the intensity of violence, whether an 
armed conflict ended, and for how long peace endured following the amnesty. 
Overall, most studies found that amnesties introduced as part of negotiated peace 
settlements are likely to have a positive effect on peace. However, some scholars delved 
deeper to argue that the positive effects of peace agreement amnesties may depend on 
the nature of the political regime or whether the amnesty extends to atrocity crimes. 
There were contrasting results relating to the impact of amnesties during ongoing conflict, 
but this may be due to what measures were used. For example, studies that sought to 
measure whether an amnesty could lead to a reduction in violence during ongoing conflict 
produced more positive results than studies that sought to measure whether amnesties 
during conflict could lead to the signing of a peace agreement or enduring peace. Given 
that not all amnesties during conflict are explicitly intended to lead to peace negotiations, 
the former seems like a more appropriate measure. Differences in the results may also 
arise depending on the sample population because, as noted above, some datasets include 
amnesty offers that may never have been implemented. The remainder of this section 
summarizes the findings from this literature.
An early and somewhat outlier study produced by Lie, Binningsbø and Gates for the World 
Bank found that ‘[a]mnesty tends to be de-stabilizing and generally associated with shorter 
peace duration’ (2007, abstract). In a later passage, they stated, ‘Amnesty … does in most 
models significantly increase the risk of peace failure’ (2007, p. 17). However, the authors 
emphasized that their findings were not very robust and were to be viewed only 
as preliminary (2007, p. 3).
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A couple of years later, Melander published a working paper that examined the statistical 
relationship between amnesty provisions in peace agreements and the likelihood that a 
peace agreement will last at least two years. Overall, Melander’s findings contrasted with 
Lie, Binningsbø and Gates’ as he argued that ‘the inclusion of amnesty provisions in peace 
agreements significantly reduces the risk that a peace agreement will fail in the sense that 
there is a return to fighting within the first two years’ (2009, p. 4). However, he added a 
caveat that this only applied if ‘the political institutions are authoritarian’ (Melander, 
2009, p. 15). He argued that in contrast 
 In democracies, and in regimes in flux, amnesty provisions have no pacifying effect.   
 Instead, peace agreements with amnesty provisions are less likely to last over the 
 crucial two year period if the institutional setting is democratic or in flux than if 
 the setting is an authoritarian regime (Melander, 2009, p. 4).
However, the terms ‘authoritarian regime’, ‘democracy,’ and ‘regime in flux’ are not 
operationalized in his paper, nor is the source his coding of regime type specified. As a 
result, it is difficult to gauge the reliability of these findings.
In a 2014 article, Reiter took a different approach to measuring impact. He relied on a 
large-N dataset to identify amnesties enacted between 1970 and 2008 during internal 
armed conflict, as part of peace processes or post-conflict (2014, p. 141). Within each 
temporal category, Reiter relied on secondary sources to distinguish between amnesties 
that were introduced for different purposes and to qualitatively assess their impact. In his 
conclusion, he noted that his findings were ‘preliminary’ (2014, p. 147). With respect to 
the impact of amnesties introduced during conflict, Reiter explored amnesties extended 
to encourage non-state actors to voluntarily surrender or demobilize. Moreover, he further 
observed that amnesties may be used during conflict to release prisoners or as self-
amnesties for state agents; reflecting on the potential purposes of such amnesties but not 
reaching any findings about their impact (and so they are not discussed here). However, he 
acknowledged that ‘it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this type of amnesty; if only 
a few individuals surrender, the event is likely to go unreported’ (2014, p. 142). However, 
he found that of the 28 amnesties of this type in his sample, only four led to sizeable 
surrenders by rebel fights. As a result, he concluded that amnesties ‘granted during conflict, 
for the most part, have no significant impact on peace, although in some cases they lead to 
a minor reduction in violence and the reintegration of armed actors’ (2014, p. 142). 
With respect to amnesties extended as part of peace processes, Reiter judged the impact 
of an amnesty on whether it led to lasting peace.7  Here, his findings are more positive than 
for the amnesties introduced during conflict, as he found that ‘When extended as part of 
a peace process - granted during negotiations, as part of an actual peace agreement, or 
passed shortly after a comprehensive agreement is signed - amnesties correlate highly with 
lasting peace’ (2014, p. 147). With respect to post-conflict amnesties, Reiter focused on 
‘amnesties categorised as efforts towards post-conflict reconciliation’, which he interpreted 
as ‘broad amnesties extended without conditions after the conflict is over’ (Reiter, 2014, 
p. 146), and further included self-amnesties such as the 1978 Chilean amnesty in this 
category - even though it was granted 12 years before the end of the Pinochet regime - 
and noted that post-conflict amnesties may provide for prisoner releases; again, he did 
not make any observations on the impact of these amnesties. He noted that ‘there is no 
case in the dataset in which a post-conflict reconciliation amnesty was extended and war 
restarted’ (2014, p. 146). On this basis, his conclusion shared the same positive tone as 
his observations on peace process amnesties, stating that ‘amnesty … appears to have the 
potential to play an important role in maintaining peace and striving towards reconciliation 
in the post-conflict environment’ (2014, p. 147). As a result, he finds that overall, there is a 
‘high correlation between amnesties and lasting peace’ (2014, p. 147).
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7
 It is inferred that he relies on the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset to identify amnesties related to conflict and 
to code conflict termination (Reiter, 2010, p. 140).
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With respect to the impact of amnesties introduced during ongoing conflict, Daniels 
explores the reduction in violence in two ways: by changes in the intensity of the conflict 8 
and by the likelihood of conflict termination 9  (2016, p. 58). Daniels presented a more 
positive picture than Reiter of the role that amnesties can play during conflict in reducing 
violence. She found that generous amnesties can reduce fighting when given directly to 
rebels to encourage them to surrender (Daniels, 2016, pp. 74-75). She further found such 
amnesties can have indirect effects on other rebel groups, which might in due course 
encourage them to surrender and accept amnesty (Daniels, 2016, p. 74-75). In addition, 
Daniels argued that her data indicates that amnesties during conflict increase the 
government’s military advantage ‘by allowing the government to be stronger in attacking 
other groups’ (2016, p. 75). She further argued that amnesties granted during a negotiation 
process ‘have a greater impact, and can even support conflict termination’ (Daniels, 
2016, p. 75).
More recently, Dancy (2018, p. 394) presented findings from a dataset of amnesties 
introduced during ongoing conflict, in peace negotiations, or post-conflict. The analysis, The 
which made use of the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset to code conflict termination 
and recurrence, focused on determining the impact of amnesties on (1) conflict termination 
and (2) whether conflict resumed within two years following a peace agreement (Dancy, 
2018, p. 388). Dancy found mixed results for amnesties depending on timing. When the 
amnesty was passed or offered during conflict in the absence of peace negotiations, it does 
‘not appear to increase the probability of conflict termination’ (Dancy, 2018, p. 388) and 
‘rebels will most likely continue hostilities’ (Dancy, 2018, p. 411). This finding should not be 
surprising given that many amnesties introduced during ongoing conflict are not intended 
to terminate conflict or even encourage entire rebel groups to disarm.
8
 To measure shifts in the intensity of the conflict, Daniels relied on ‘the UCDP coding of high (1,000+ deaths per 
year) and low (25-999 deaths per year) intensity’ (2016, p. 58).
9
 The measure of conflict termination ‘is taken from the UCDP dataset and is included if the ending is followed by
one or more years of conflict inactivity’ (Daniels, 2016, p. 59).
In contrast, Dancy observed that amnesties ‘do decrease the risk of conflict recurrence 
when offered during negotiations at the end of fighting’ (2018, p. 388). This finding echoes 
the conclusions reached by Reiter and Daniels. In exploring this point further, Dancy noted 
that
 amnesties are also more effective when they are embedded within larger processes   
 of peace. If amnesties are disembodied from a larger framework, or haphazardly   
 offered by governments in high-pressure moments, it might do little to produce 
 trust on the other side. The offer simply will not be perceived as credible. However,   
 when they are passed following lengthy and iterated processes of negotiation - 
 often as part of larger postconflict deals to release political prisoners, forgive former   
 soldiers of crimes against the state, or to help demobilize the opposition - they are   
 sometimes successful (Dancy, 2018, p. 417).
However, as noted above, Dancy cautioned that amnesties post-termination pacifying 
effects are ‘absent in instances where the offer exculpates combatants for atrocity crimes 
and other serious violations of human rights’ (2018, p. 388).
Unlike the datasets reviewed in this section, the ACPA dataset does not seek to evaluate 
the impact of amnesties. However, through its greater disaggregation of data depending 
on context, beneficiaries, crimes, conditionality and legal effects, it can provide a basis 
for future work to explore in greater detail how amnesties can impact on reducing 
the intensity of conflict, the likelihood of a peace agreements being signed, and the 
sustainability of peace.
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Part II: 
Introducing the Amnesties, Conflict and 
Peace Agreements (ACPA) Dataset
The Amnesties, Conflict and Peace Agreements (ACPA) dataset contains data on amnesties 
that are introduced during ongoing conflict, as part of peace negotiations, or in post-
conflict periods from 1990-2016 in all world regions. This dataset is a subset of a larger 
Amnesty Law Database that contains information on amnesties that have occurred 
since the Second World War and which relate to a wider range of political crises, such 
as civil unrest, military coups, or authoritarian government, as well as international and 
internal armed conflict. To be included in the Amnesty Law Database, and its ACPA subset, 
amnesties must meet some criteria:
] They must allow for the removal of criminal liability pre-conviction. Amnesties included  
 the database may have additional legal effects with respect to persons who have   
 already been convicted at the time of the law’s enactment. However, unlike some of  
 the existing research reviewed in Section 2, the Amnesty Law Database does not   
 include any forms of leniency that only apply post-conviction (even where such   
 measures are termed ‘amnesty’).
] There must be evidence that the amnesty was implemented, for example, through   
 the enactment of legislation or executive decrees, through administrative processes,   
 or through the creation of truth commissions with the power to grant or recommend
  amnesty. The database does not capture information on peace agreements that   
 proclaim amnesty, but where the amnesty was not subsequently enacted; peace   
 agreements with amnesty commitments where the peace agreement was not signed  
 by all the parties or implemented; amnesty offers made by government figures 
 that are not subsequently enacted or implemented; or peace agreement provisions 
 that call upon the parties to refrain from prosecution, rather than calling on them 
 to actively grant amnesty. 
] They must be granted by official institutions, including regional governments;   
 amnesties proclaimed by non-state actors are excluded.
Individual amnesty processes in the larger Amnesty Law Database are identified for 
inclusion in the ACPA sample, where they are related to conflict or peace agreements:
] For an amnesty to be deemed to be related to conflict, it must be introduced (a) while 
a conflict is ongoing, (b) as part of a negotiated settlement to end conflict, or (c) following 
the end of a conflict where the amnesty relates to crimes committed during the conflict. 
The existence of a conflict is identified using the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. 10 
] To determine whether an amnesty is related to a peace agreement, the ACPA sample 
relies predominantly on the Peace Agreement Access Tool (PA-X),11  which enables users 
to retrieve excerpts from peace agreement texts. In a small number of instances where 
PA-X was not able to obtain the primary text of a peace agreement, the ACPA dataset 
relies on secondary sources such as academic writings or media reports to determine if 
an amnesty is linked to peace negotiation. This approach allows for the implementation 
of peace agreement amnesty commitments to be charted through national legislation 
and supporting regulations on a comparative scale that has not been undertaken in any 
previous research.
Where an amnesty process fits within the inclusion criteria, detailed qualitative 
information is compiled on the:
] Enactment process; 
] Categories of beneficiaries; 
] Crimes covered;
] Conditions attached to the amnesty; 
] Amnesty’s legal effects; and 
] Implementation process. 
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10
 Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset uses the following definition of armed conflict: ‘An armed conflict is a 
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two 
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar 
year.’ See UCDP, ‘Definitions’. Available at: http://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Ceasefire_agreements 
[accessed 6 June 2018].
11
 PA-X Peace Agreements Database. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/ [accessed 6 June 2018].
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As far as possible, this qualitative data consists of excerpts from primary legal sources 
(amnesty legislation, legislative amendments, implementing regulations etc) coded in 
relation to specific variables within the database. On occasion, the primary legal texts are 
supplemented with analysis from secondary sources such as national and international 
judicial decisions and reports by international human rights organizations. Where amnesty 
legislation is not available, the descriptions of individual amnesty processes are developed 
using as wide a range of secondary sources as possible, including judicial decisions, truth 
commission reports, academic writings, reports by intergovernmental human rights 
organizations, reports by national and international human rights organizations, and 
media reports.
Part III: 
General Trends in the ACPA Data
The ACPA dataset contains detailed qualitative data on 289 amnesties introduced between 
1 January 1990 and 31 August 2016 (note however that several amnesties have since 
been introduced since August 2016) in response to armed conflict. The total number of 
amnesties listed in the Amnesty Law Database as being enacted or introduced from 1 
January 1990 is 380. This indicates that about 76 per cent over amnesties introduced over 
this period relate to armed conflict and/or peace agreements. Conflicted-related amnesties 
are therefore far more common than amnesties enacted as part of transitions from 
authoritarianism or in response to other political crises which have not reached conflict 
thresholds.
The amnesties listed in the ACPA dataset were introduced in 75 countries plus two 
amnesties enacted jointly by two countries. This makes clear that for the vast majority 
of cases, countries enacted multiple amnesties during conflict and/or the peace process; 
among the highest rates of amnesty use are in Afghanistan and Sudan with 11 amnesties, 
Chad with 13 and Sri Lanka with 32. At times, one country repeatedly used amnesties 
for the same purpose with respect to the same groups of beneficiaries. However, in some 
instances, the same countries used amnesties in a number of different ways. This section 
will set out some of the broad trends emerging from the dataset regarding when and where 
amnesties are introduced.
Implementation of peace agreement amnesty commitments
The dataset contains information on 115 amnesties that were introduced to fulfil peace 
agreement amnesty commitments. In contrast, there were only 23 peace agreement 
amnesty commitments for which no evidence of implementation could be found. This 
suggests that 83 per cent of peace agreement amnesty commitments were implemented 
to some degree. Where peace agreement amnesty commitments were not implemented, 
this was generally due to either the violence reigniting or political contestation over 
legislative proposals to enact the amnesty.
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Amnesty introduction over time
Figure 1 provides a timeline of when the amnesties in the ACPA dataset were introduced:
 
Figure 1 indicates that there has been a pronounced downward trend in the number of 
new conflicted-related amnesties introduced per year from 1990 to 2015. This drop has 
happened even though, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the number of 
conflicts in the world has increased between 2010 and 2016.12  Although the amnesties 
in the ACPA dataset cover ongoing conflict, peace negotiations and post-conflict periods, 
to get a sense of whether trends in amnesty enactment are tied to trends in peace 
agreements more broadly, data taken from the PA-X Peace Agreement Database on number 
of comprehensive peace agreements signed each year have been added to Figure 1.13  
The orange trend line indicates that there has only be a slight decline in the number of 
comprehensive agreements signed annually. Cumulatively, this suggests that a downward 
trend in the introduction of amnesties does not correlate with reductions in the number of 
armed conflicts globally or a decline in peace agreements. For human rights advocates, this 
could be interpreted as a consequence of the development of a global accountability norm.
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12
 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, ‘Armed Conflict by Region, 1946-2016’. Available at: http://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/
charts-graphs-and-maps [accessed 27 June 2018].
13
 PA-X Peace Agreements Database. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/ [accessed 6 June 2018].
Figure 2 illustrates the number of amnesties enacted each year to implement peace 
agreement amnesty commitments:
The dotted trend line in this chart makes clear that the number of amnesties introduced 
each year to implement peace agreement amnesty commitments has undergone only 
a slight decline over the last few decades. This decline is less pronounced than the trend 
illustrated in Figure 1 for all amnesties in the ACPA dataset. Furthermore, unsurprisingly, 
the trend in Figure 2 aligns more closely with trend in comprehensive peace agreements 
illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure	2:	Implementation	of	peace	agreement	amnesty	commitments	by	year	(1990-2016)
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Amnesty introduction across world regions
Figure 3 illustrates regional trends in the introduction of amnesties for conflict and peace, 
the regions being coded using the list of geographic regions produced by the UN Statistical 
Department. 
 
Figure 3 shows that amnesties were used in all world regions since 1990. It also 
demonstrates that considerably more amnesties were introduced by countries in Africa 
and Asia since 1990 than in other world regions. This corresponds to Uppsala/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset, which shows that these two regions had higher rates of conflict than 
other regions over this period.14  However, according to the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset, the rates of conflict in these two regions were largely similar across this period, 
but as Figure 3 illustrates, Asia has had more amnesties (n=125) than Africa (n=100). 
This could in part be because Sri Lanka had 32 amnesties (including 28 amnesties for draft 
evaders and deserters), which is a much more frequent rate of amnesty repetition than any 
other country in the dataset.
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Figure	3:	Conflict/peace	agreement	
amnesties	by	region	(1990-2016)
14
 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, ‘Armed Conflict by Region, 1946-2016’ Available at: http://pcr.uu.se/
digitalAssets/667/c_667494-l_1-k_armed-conflict-by-region--1946-2016.pdf [accessed 6 June 2018].
Political regimes and amnesty introduction
As explored in Section 2, existing literature has found that although all types of 
government use amnesties, democracies are less likely to grant amnesty than ‘mixed 
regimes’ or dictatorial regimes (Loyle and Binningsbø, 2016; Daniels, 2016). Furthermore, 
Melander (2009) argued that amnesties are more likely to reduce the risk that a peace 
agreement will fail where the amnesty is introduced by an authoritarian regime. Figure 4 
uses Freedom House’s Freedom in the World data to illustrate the distribution of amnesties 
within the ACPA dataset across regime type. Freedom House codes regime type as free 
(generally considered to be both electoral and liberal democracies), partly free (countries 
that tend to carry out elections but do not necessarily ensure their citizens’ enjoyment of 
civil liberties), and not free (countries with severely constrained civil liberties and flawed or 
non-existent electoral processes).15 
 
This figure supports the findings of the earlier studies by showing that fewer amnesties 
are granted in democratic states, even though Polity IV data indicates that throughout the 
period from 1990 to 2016, the number of democratic states has exceeded the number of 
mixed or authoritarian regimes (Polity Project, 2018). 
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Figure	4:	Amnesty	trends	by	
regime	type	(1990-2016)
15
 Freedom House, Freedom in the World: 2018 – Methodology. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/
methodology-freedom-world-2018 [accessed 6 June 2018]. The author notes that Freedom House’s methodological 
and ideological underpinnings have subject to extensive academic criticism. See eg Giannone, 2010; Bogaards, 2011; 
Steiner, 2014.
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Timing of amnesties during conflict and peace
The ACPA dataset captures data on the use of amnesties at three different stages: during 
armed conflict; as part of political negotiations; and post-conflict. This longer-time 
frame is useful as it exposes the extent to which states repeatedly use amnesties during 
and post-conflict and it recognizes that peace processes are long-term processes and 
commitments made on amnesty and accountability in a peace agreement may be subject 
to renegotiation or amendment as the transition unfolds. For example, amnesties can be 
enacted in the post-conflict period, even where no amnesty was envisaged in an earlier 
peace agreement.
To facilitate this analysis of the relationship between amnesty design and context, the 
amnesties in the ACPA dataset were assigned to the following temporal phases:
CONTEXT DESCRIPTION
Conflict in absence of 
negotiations
Amnesty is granted during ongoing conflict and 
available sources describing its introduction do not 
link it to ongoing negotiations or hopes that it would 
lead to political negotiations. Often these amnesties 
are linked instead to strengthening the state’s 
military objectives.
Pre-negotiations Government grants amnesty with the publicly stated 
objective of using the amnesty to pave the way for 
political negotiations.
Mid-negotiations Amnesty is granted while political negotiations are 
taking place. This can include amnesties granted after 
an initial ceasefire or other preliminary agreements, 
but before the signing of a comprehensive agreement.
CONTEXT DESCRIPTION
Comprehensive 
agreement
Amnesty results from commitments in 
comprehensive peace agreements.
Post-agreement Amnesties enacted after a peace agreement, where 
the agreement made no explicit mention of amnesty. 
Post-agreement amnesties can be enacted soon 
after the peace agreement or several years later. This 
category also includes new amnesties introduced 
to extend the scope of earlier amnesties that were 
enacted as part of a comprehensive agreement.
UN Interim 
administration or 
occupying power
Amnesty is granted by a UN interim administration 
following the end of a conflict or an occupying power.
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Table	1:	Coding	of	amnesty	by	context
Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements  //  29
Figure 5 shows the proportion of amnesties enacted at each phase of conflict and peace 
between 1990 and 2016:
 
Figure 5 shows that 44 per cent of amnesties in the dataset were introduced during 
ongoing armed conflicts, when no negotiations were in sight. In such settings, it does not 
seem appropriate to measure the impact of the amnesty on whether a peace agreement 
was reached or endured for a designated period. As such, some of the existing research 
on amnesty impact reviewed above may be using inappropriate measures of impact for 
amnesties in these settings. Indicators that are more appropriate could be to consider the 
numbers of individual combatants who took part in the amnesty process or whether there 
was a reduction in the intensity of violence following the amnesty.
Figure 5 also indicates that once warring parties begin to move towards negotiations, the 
frequency with which amnesties are used increases. Twenty-four per cent of amnesties 
were granted in the comprehensive agreement phase compared to only seven per cent 
during pre-negotiations. A further ten per cent of amnesties were granted in the post-
agreement phase. The following sections of this report explore the extent to which amnesty 
design differs across these various stages.
Conflict, no negotiations
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Mid-negotiations
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Figure	5:	Context	in	which	new	
amnesties	have	been	introduced	
or	enacted	(1990-2016)
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Part IV: 
Amnesty Design during 
Conflict and Peace
This section illustrates patterns in amnesty design with respect to the crimes covered by 
the amnesty, amnesty beneficiaries, the conditions attached to amnesties, and the range 
of legal effects that can result from an amnesty. It demonstrates that there is considerable 
diversity among amnesties granted during conflict and peace and in particular, there 
are discernible differences in amnesties depending upon the context in which they are 
introduced. The range of approaches to amnesty design is a product of the different 
purposes for which amnesties are used and may have substantial implications on the 
impact of an amnesty on sustainable peace.
Which crimes are amnestied?
A central and often controversial feature of amnesty design is which crimes are covered by 
the amnesty. The ACPA dataset codes data on crimes into the categories listed in Table 2:
           [cont’d]
CATEGORY OF CRIME DESCRIPTION
International crimes This includes atrocity crimes (i.e. genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity) as well as serious 
violations of human rights (i.e. summary, arbitrary 
and extrajudicial executions, torture, enforced 
disappearances, and sexual violence). Determining 
whether international crimes are covered by an 
amnesty can be complex given that states rarely 
explicitly state this in amnesty legislation. This 
dataset enters data relating on whether an amnesty 
includes or excludes international crimes only when:
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CATEGORY OF CRIME DESCRIPTION
International crimes a) international crimes are explicitly mentioned in  
 the text of the amnesty, which generally only  
 occurs where those crimes are being excluded  
 from its scope; 
b) when national or international case law indicates  
 that the amnesty included or excluded these  
 crimes; and/or 
c) when there is credible evidence (eg in reports 
 by the UN or international human rights   
 organizations) that (i) crimes under international 
 law took place and (ii) that the group(s)   
 benefitting from the amnesty were responsible  
 for those crimes.
Political crimes This includes crimes such as treason, sedition, 
subversive, rebellion, using false documents, forgery, 
propaganda, possessing illegal weapons, espionage, 
membership of banned political or religious 
organizations, desertion, and defamation. It may also 
include broader approaches that grant amnesty for 
political crimes and related common crimes or for 
all offences related to the conflict.
Economic crimes This covers crimes such as theft of public resources 
by state officials; theft or extortion against civilians; 
smuggling; black market trading, trading with the 
enemy; crimes committed for personal enrichment; 
and drug trafficking.
CATEGORY OF CRIME DESCRIPTION
Crimes against 
individuals
This covers a broad range of offences under domestic 
law that may not reach the threshold of international 
crimes including murder, sexual violence, assault, and 
kidnapping.
Sexual violence This covers a range of violent offences of a sexual 
nature including rape, sexual violence, enforced 
prostitution, incest, and crimes known as ‘crimes 
against honour’. It may include sexual violence 
against men and women.
Draft evasion and 
desertion
This covers offences related to draft evasion and 
desertion.
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Table	2:	Categories	of	crimes
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With the exception of international crimes, for which as discussed in Table 2, separate 
analytical steps are taken to determine the material scope of amnesties, for all other 
categories of crimes, the coding of an amnesty’s material scope is based on the primary 
legislation (or, where that is unavailable, secondary sources reporting its scope). Figure 6 
illustrates the prevalence of each category of crime included or excluded from amnesties:
Figure 6 shows us, perhaps unsurprisingly, that political offences are by far the most 
commonly amnestied category of crime. It also shows that slightly more amnesties were 
granted for draft evasion and desertion than for international crimes. In addition, Figure 6 
illustrates that roughly equal numbers of amnesties included and excluded international 
crimes. The dataset records international crimes as being included or excluded in 151 of 
the 289 amnesty processes in the sample. As the issue is not relevant for almost half of 
the amnesties in the sample, the focus of much of the literature on amnesties on whether 
amnesties can cover international crimes, seems somewhat misplaced.
Figure	6:	Material	scope	of	amnesty	laws	(1990-2016)
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
No of amnesties including
Political Crimes Draft Evasion
and desertion
International Crimes Crimes against 
individuals
Economic Crimes Sexual Violence
No of amnesties excluding
34  //  Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements
If we look at the breakdown of crimes that are amnestied by context in Table 3, 
unsurprisingly, we can see that in all conflict and peace phases, there are high rates of 
amnesties for political offences. In addition, we can see that crimes related to draft evasion 
and desertion are included in a higher proportion of amnesties while armed conflicts are 
ongoing. States often introduce such amnesties where high rates of desertion undermine 
their military capacity. In addition, amnesties for international crimes are included in higher 
proportions in pre-negotiation and post-agreement phases. In the pre-negotiation phase, 
states may grant such amnesties where they need incentives to persuade non-state actors 
to enter into negotiations. In contrast, in the post-agreement phase, they may reflect a 
backlash against the onset of criminal investigations and trials.
Political 
crimes
Draft evasion 
and desertion
International 
crimes
Crimes against 
individuals
Economic 
crimes
Sexual 
violence
Conflict, no 
negotiations
(n=126)
Pre-
negotiation
(n=19)
Mid-
negotiations
(n=43)
Comprehensive 
Agreement
(n=70)
Post-
Agreement
(n=28)
UN /
occupier
(n=3)
90 (71%)
41 (33%)
17 (13%)
22 (17%)
3 (2%)
2 (2%)
19 (100%)
2 (11%)
11 (58%)
2 (11%)
1 (5%)
0
37 (86%)
11 (26%)
0
8 (19%)
2 (5%)
1 (2%)
70 (100%)
10 (14%)
24 (34%)
20 (29%)
5 (7%)
7 (10%)
26 (93%)
4 (14%)
13 (46%)
10 (36%)
2 (7%)
0
3 (100%)
0
0
1 (33%)
0
0
Table	3:	Crimes	covered	by	amnesties	by	context	(1990-2016)
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Table 4 illustrates the categories of crimes that are excluded from amnesty in different 
contexts (Note that there are no amnesties in the dataset that exclude crimes relating to 
draft evasion and desertion. Therefore, that category is omitted from Table 4.)
We can see amnesties that exclude international crimes are less prevalent during ongoing 
conflict than in comprehensive peace agreements. In addition, comparing Tables 3 and 
4 reveals that sexual violence and economic crimes are more likely to be excluded from 
amnesties in all contexts than included. In addition, crimes against individuals are excluded 
from amnesties at higher rates than they are included for all contexts, except the post-
agreement phase.
Political 
crimes
International 
crimes
Crimes against 
individuals
Economic 
crimes
Sexual 
violence
Conflict, no 
negotiations
(n=126)
Pre-
negotiation
(n=19)
Mid-
negotiations
(n=43)
Comprehensive 
Agreement
(n=70)
Post-
Agreement
(n=28)
UN /
occupier
(n=3)
18 (14%)
15 (12%)
24 (19%)
7 (6%)
7 (6%)
4 (21%)
6 (32%)
5 (26%)
3 (16%)
4 (21%)
7 (16%)
10 (23%)
13 (30%)
6 (14%)
7 (16%)
12 (17%)
23 (33%)
25 (36%)
6 (9%)
8 (11%)
5 (18%)
9 (32%)
6 (21%)
3 (11%)
4 (14%)
1 (33%)
3 (100%)
2 (67%)
0
1 (33%)
Table	4:	Crimes	excluded	from	amnesties	by	context	(1990-2016)
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As amnesties for international crimes are the most controversial part of amnesty design, 
the final part of this section focuses on trends in conflict- and peace-related amnesties 
covering these crimes. Figure 7 shows the numbers of amnesties that include and exclude 
these crimes for each year in the data sample.
It is striking that the trend lines for amnesties that include and exclude international crimes 
(shown by the dotted lines) closely overlap. This shows that overall states are as likely to 
include these crimes in amnesties related to conflict and peace, as they are to exclude 
them. This finding is significant for debates regarding whether customary international law 
has evolved to prohibit amnesties for war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflict, particularly since the vast majority of amnesties in this data sample relate to this 
type of conflict.
Figure	7:	Peace	agreements,	amnesties,	and	international	crimes	(1990-2015)
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Finally, Figures 8 and 9 explore whether regime type is related to whether amnesties 
include or exclude international crimes:
The comparison reveals that free and partly free states are more likely to exclude 
international crimes than include them, whereas not free states are more likely to grant 
amnesties for international crimes. In all instances, however, the differences in the numbers 
of amnesties involved are not large.
Free Not Free Partly Free
Figure	8:	Amnesties	for	international	
crimes	by	regime	type
Free Not Free Partly Free
Figure	9:	Amnesties	that	exclude	
international	crimes	by	regime	type
Who is granted amnesty?
In discussions on the role of amnesties in peace agreements, attention often focuses on 
whether the amnesty extends to combatants, both state actors and members of non-state 
armed groups. This attention is not misplaced as (former) combatants are often responsible 
for serious crimes and violations, may pose the most significant threat to peace, and are 
most likely to benefit from conflict- and peace-related amnesties.
However, amnesties during conflict and peace may also benefit other groups, who may or 
may not overlap with the combatant factions. These groups are summarized in Table 5:
CATEGORY OF 
RECIPIENT DESCRIPTION
Members of non-state 
armed groups
Amnesties that are described as applying to:
a) members of specified non-state armed groups  
 (eg where the organizations are identified by  
 name, where the amnesty applies to   
 organizations that have signed ceasefire   
 agreements or peace agreements);
b) rebel fighters, guerrillas or other similar terms;  
 and 
c) crimes committed during the conflict, without  
 specifying any form of personal affiliation etc.  
 This can include where the amnesty applies to  
 specific conflict-related offences including 
 aggression, rebellion, violations of state security. 
For many amnesties, this category includes not 
just combatants but also sympathisers of and 
collaborators with armed groups.
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CATEGORY OF 
RECIPIENT DESCRIPTION
State actors Amnesties for those who worked for or on behalf of 
the state in an official capacity when they committed 
their crimes, such as in the military, police, prison 
services, intelligence agencies, civil service, and 
politicians. This can include retired state personnel.
Draft evasion and 
desertion
This category draws on the data contained the 
amnesties granted for crimes related to draft evasion 
and desertion.
Nationals outside
the borders
Amnesties that are granted for nationals who are 
living outside the territory, including
a) Those who fled the violence or conscription
b) Political dissidents
c) Members of an insurgency group operating   
 outside the borders
Security detainees This can include amnesties for
a) protestors and demonstrators; 
b) other political detainees (who have been held 
without trial);
c) persons accused of security offences or crimes 
against the state where secondary sources do not 
clearly identify such persons as being part of non-
state armed groups or where credible secondary 
sources argue that that anti-terrorism legislation etc 
is being used to detain large numbers of people who 
were not involved in violence (e.g. Syria and Iraq).
              [cont’d]
 
CATEGORY OF 
RECIPIENT DESCRIPTION
Security detainees Note that to be included in the sample for this study, 
these forms of amnesties are only included where 
they are enacted within a context where the violence 
exceeds 25 battle related deaths within one year as 
per the Uppsala Conflict Data Program definition of 
ponflict discussed in Section 3.
Coup participants Amnesties for coup participants.
Foreign nationals Amnesties that benefit foreign nationals who have 
committed crimes within the territory of the state 
granting the amnesty.
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Table	5:	Categories	of	amnesty	recipients	(1990-2016)
These distinctions are important as they have implications for the extent to which the 
amnesty can contribute to an inclusive peace process as well as for the legitimacy of the 
amnesty. For example, a report published by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
described the enactment of amnesties and other legal guarantees for refugees as a ‘core 
component’ (2004, s. 1.4) for voluntary repatriation and it states that part of its role should 
be to encourage the enactment of such amnesties prior to a peace agreement (2004, s. 
4.18). Furthermore, the inclusion of nationals who are outside the borders of the enacting 
state as well as foreign nationals within its borders speaks to the cross-border dynamics of 
contemporary conflicts and is a subject of increasing international interest in the context 
of the global events to combat terrorism and political extremism.
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Figure 10 shows the proportion of amnesties granted to these different categories of 
beneficiaries.
This chart shows, unsurprisingly, that members of non-state armed groups are the greatest 
beneficiaries of conflict-related amnesties. They benefited from 207 of the 289 amnesties 
included in this sample. In contrast, only 72 amnesties covered state actors and of these 
only 14 applied exclusively to state actors. Of the 14 amnesties exclusively for state actors, 
only five granted amnesty to international crimes. There were 58 amnesties for both state 
actors and members of non-state armed groups and of these 28 covered international 
crimes. Finally, 149 amnesties covered only members of non-state armed groups, of these 
31 were granted for international crimes.
Figure	10:	Amnesties	by	Recipient	(1990-2016)
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Table 6 shows the breakdown of this data by context:
Table 6 indicates that at all stages between conflict and peace, non-state armed groups are 
included in a majority of amnesties introduced. Interestingly, this data shows that state 
actors are included in a greater proportion of amnesties when a peace agreement has been 
reached and they are included in 43 per cent of amnesties in the post-agreement period. 
This perhaps reflects that during the conflict, state actors faced little prospect of criminal 
accountability; however, as the former regime is forced to share power with or even 
relinquish power to its opponents, state actors may begin to feel more exposed to criminal 
liability and may demand amnesty to protect themselves.
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Non-state 
armed groups
State agents
Draft evaders 
and deserters
Nationals 
outside borders
Security 
detainees
Participants in 
coups d’état
Foreigners
Conflict, no 
negotiations
(n=126)
Pre-
negotiation
(n=19)
Mid-
negotiations
(n=43)
Comprehensive 
Agreement
(n=70)
Post-
Agreement
(n=28)
UN /
occupier
(n=3)
75 (56%)
19 (15%)
41 (33%)
26 (21%)
14 (11%)
5 (4%)
4 (3%)
17 (89%)
6 (32%)
2 (11%)
2 (11%)
2 (11%)
0
1 (5%)
31 (72%)
7 (16%)
11 (26%)
9 (21%)
5 (12%)
2 (5%)
1 (2%)
58 (83%)
27 (39%)
10 (14%)
16 (23%)
4 (6%)
7 (10%)
2 (3%)
24 (86%)
12 (43%)
4 (14%)
5 (18%)
2 (7%)
1 (6%)
1 (6%)
2 (67%)
1 (33%)
0
0
1 (33%)
0
0
Table	6:	Amnesty	recipients	by	context	(1990-2016)
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Finally, Figures 11 and 12 focus on combatant groups in conflicts to explore the relationship 
between regime type and amnesty beneficiaries. 
These figures show that roughly equal proportions of partly free and not free states grant 
amnesty to non-state armed groups. In contrast, 50 per cent of amnesties for state actors 
are granted by partly free states, whereas only 40 per cent are granted by not free states. 
These figures are intriguing given that to the limited extent that existing literature has 
explored amnesties for state actors, it has mostly focused on self-amnesties granted by 
illegitimate regimes to benefit their agents who have carried out serious human rights 
violations (see eg Olson 2006; Ludwin King 2010). Less attention has been paid to why 
and with what effect partly free regimes use amnesties for state actors.
Free Not Free Partly Free
Figure	8:	Amnesties	for	international	
crimes	by	regime	type
Free Not Free Partly Free
Figure	9:	Amnesties	that	exclude	
international	crimes	by	regime	type
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What conditions are attached?
Some amnesty beneficiaries can be required to comply with conditions to obtain or 
retain amnesty, and this ‘amnesty conditionality’ is an important element of amnesty 
design. Conditionality can shape the ability of an amnesty to contribute to reducing 
security threats and consolidating sustainable peace. Where the amnesty is conditioned 
on former combatants telling the truth about their actions, contributing to reparations, 
or participating in non-criminal justice initiatives, this can enhance the amnesty’s 
compatibility with states’ international legal obligations to investigate serious violations of 
human rights and to provide remedies where violations have been breached. However, with 
the exception of detailed examinations of individual amnesty processes, there has been 
little academic examination of when and how conditions are attached to amnesties.
Two of the studies in Section 2 coded amnesties as conditional or unconditional, which 
enabled them to report findings on the relationship between context and conditionality. 
Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster (2012, p. 735) stated that most amnesties are 
unconditional, particularly where they result from a peace agreement. Daniels (2016, p. 45) 
stated that democracies are less likely than authoritarian regimes to offer unconditional 
amnesties. Neither study disaggregated the data by the type of condition attached, 
although Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster (2012, p. 735) observed that post-conflict 
amnesties are generally conditional on rebels giving up fighting. The remainder of this 
section uses the ACPA dataset to interrogate and expand on these findings by exploring 
trends in the different type of conditions that are attached to amnesty as well as analysing 
when unconditional amnesties are used.
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CONDITION DESCRIPTION
Deadlines to surrender 
and/or apply for 
amnesty
Deadlines that amnesty beneficiaries must meet 
to benefit from an amnesty process (including any 
extensions) and the process for surrendering by this 
deadline.
Participate in 
disarmament, 
demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR)
The process for former combatants to surrender 
and hand over weapons to the authorities as well as 
subsequent stages of the DDR process where that is 
discussed in the amnesty or related legal texts.
Renounce violence Requirements for amnesty beneficiaries to
a) make a statement pledging allegiance, repenting  
 past actions or beliefs, and/or promising not to  
 re-offend. Such statements can be public or in  
 camera statements to public officials; 
b) adhere to national laws, respect the constitution  
 and the rule of law; 
c) pledge to quit militant groups; 
d) release hostages; and/or 
e) apologize or express remorse
Non-recidivism Amnesties that
a) remove of the benefits of the amnesty for   
 persons who re-offend; and/or
b) exclude beneficiaries of previous amnesties who  
 pe-offended.
CONDITION DESCRIPTION
Tell truth Amnesties that require individuals to disclose the 
truth about their own criminal actions. This includes 
information on the manner in which the truth must 
be told (written process, oral testimony); criteria for 
determining if the truth has been told; and processes 
for assessing the veracity of information disclosed.
Inform on comrades Amnesties that require applicants to provide the 
state with information on their former comrades, 
leaders, and organizations that would provide the 
state with a military advantage and/or enable it to 
arrest opponents.
Contribute to 
reparations
Amnesties that require beneficiaries to make material 
contributions to reparations (symbolic forms of 
reparations are coded under ‘renounce violence’). 
The state can also be required to pay reparations for 
pmnestied offences.
Participate in 
alternative justice 
programmes
Amnesties that require beneficiaries to take part in 
traditional/informal/restorative justice processes.
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Table	7:	Conditions	attached	to	amnesties
Figure 13 illustrates the number of amnesties within the sample that contained each of 
these forms of conditions:
This illustrates that the most commonly occurring conditions are those that seek to ensure 
that combatants disarm, renounce violence, and refrain from recidivism. This is unsurprising 
as these conditions are beneficial for the state in ensuring that in exchange for amnesty, 
rebels end their insurgency. It is also common practice for deadlines to be imposed to 
encourage potential amnesty beneficiaries to come forward and participate in the process. 
Less common are conditions that offer direct benefit to victims, such as, requirements that 
combatants disclose the truth about their actions, contribute to reparations, or participate 
in alternative justice mechanisms. The lack of such conditions could reflect the state’s 
inability to attach conditions in cases where there is a delicate balance of power in the 
negotiations. Conditions that impose greater costs on amnesty beneficiaries in terms of 
potential damage to individual reputations and/or perceptions of the legitimacy of their 
armed struggle are more likely to be resisted by the intended beneficiaries of the amnesty. 
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Figure	13:	Conditional	amnesties	(1990-2016)
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However, the absence of more victim-centred conditions in the grant of an amnesty 
does not automatically equate to the absence of truth recovery or reparations, as such 
mechanisms can be implemented separately to amnesties as part of the wider peace 
process. In addition, (and not reflected in Figure 13), some amnesties in the ACPA sample 
were granted to those who have had their rights violated, including political prisoners, and 
refugees and exiles.
If we turn now to when conditional amnesties are introduced, Table 8 sets out conditional 
amnesties by context:
Deadlines to 
surrender 
and/or apply
Participate in 
DDR
Renounce 
violence
Non-recidivism
Tell the truth
Inform on 
comrades
Contributing to 
reparations
Participate in 
alternative 
justice 
mechanism
Conflict, no 
negotiations
(n=126)
Pre-
negotiation
(n=19)
Mid-
negotiations
(n=43)
Comprehensive 
Agreement
(n=70)
Post-
Agreement
(n=28)
UN /
occupier
(n=3)
59 (47%)
40 (32%)
20 (16%)
15 (12%)
7 (6%)
9 (7%)
3 (2%)
0
5 (26%)
8 (42%)
4 (21%)
3 (16%)
1 (5%)
0
0
0
17 (40%)
13 (30%)
10 (23%)
8 (19%)
4 (9%)
3 (7%)
3 (7%)
1 (2%)
17 (24%)
18 (26%)
9 (13%)
9 (13%)
6 (9%)
1 (1%)
5 (7%)
1 (1%)
4 (14%)
7 (25%)
3 (11%)
5 (18%)
2 (7%)
0
0
0
1 (33%)
1 (33%)
2 (67%)
1 (33%)
1 (33%)
0
1 (33%)
1 (33%)
Table	8:	Conditional	Amnesties	by	Context	(1990-2016)
This table reveals that some forms of conditionality, such as the requirement to engage 
with DDR processes, are used in all contexts. However, contrary to Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates 
and Elster’s (2012, p. 735, emphasis added) findings, it is does not seem that ‘post-conflict 
amnesties are generally conditional on rebels giving up fighting’ as only a quarter of the 
amnesties in the post-conflict phase included this condition. Instead, it seems much more 
likely that conditions requiring rebels to surrender and disarm are applied to amnesties 
granted pre- or mid-negotiations as ACPA data helps to explain.
Within the ACPA sample, 107 of the 289 amnesties were unconditional. This finding 
contrasts with Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster’s observation that most amnesties are 
unconditional. Table 9 illustrates the prevalence of unconditional amnesties by context. 
Similar to Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster (2012), it finds that unconditional amnesties 
are more likely as a peace process becomes established, with 56 per cent amnesties 
resulting from peace agreements being unconditional and 61 per cent of post-agreement 
amnesties having no conditions attached.
Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements  //  49
No of 
unconditional 
amnesties
Conflict, no 
negotiations
(n=126)
Pre-
negotiation
(n=19)
Mid-
negotiations
(n=43)
Comprehensive 
Agreement
(n=70)
Post-
Agreement
(n=28)
UN /
occupier
(n=3)
34 (27%) 6 (32%) 11 (26%) 39 (56%) 17 (61%) 0
Table	9:	Unconditional	amnesties	by	context	(1990-2016)
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The ACPA dataset also allows us to explore whether the type of government introducing 
the amnesty affects the amnesty’s conditionality. The findings displayed in Figure 14 and 
Figure 15 support Daniels’ findings by demonstrating that democracies (shown in light 
brown) are less likely than authoritarian regimes (shown in yellow) to offer unconditional 
amnesties. However, this data also shows that fewer democracies offer conditional 
amnesties. In addition, the data shows that conditional amnesties are most often offered 
by partly free states (shown in dark brown), whereas roughly equally numbers of partly 
free (46 per cent) and unfree states (44 per cent) offer unconditional amnesties.
One final issue to consider with respect to trends in the use of conditional amnesties is the 
relationship between amnesty beneficiaries and the types of conditions that are attached. 
Figure	14:	Conditional	amnesties	by	
regime	type	(1990-2016)
Figure	15:	Unconditional	amnesties
by	regime	type	(1990-2016)
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Figure 16 summarizes this data:
This chart illustrates that across all categories of conditions, greater numbers of conditional 
amnesties apply to non-state armed groups, than to state actors. This is unsurprising given 
that considerably more amnesties in the sample benefit not-state armed groups. However, 
this figure also shows that greater numbers of unconditional amnesties apply to persons 
who have engaged in violence against the state.
Figure	16:	Conditional	amnesties	by	beneficiary
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This data suggests that for some forms of conditionality, such as non-recidivism 
requirements, there are equal proportions of amnesty applying this condition to both 
categories of beneficiary. In contrast, 38 per cent of amnesties for non-state armed groups 
are unconditional, whereas 47 per cent of amnesties for state actors are unconditional. 
Given that unconditional amnesties for combatants are likely to result in greater impunity, 
than amnesties that require beneficiaries to engage with the peace process and contribute 
to truth and reparations, this data suggests that risk of impunity increases where amnesties 
extend to state actors.
Overall, this section demonstrates that multiple, distinct forms of conditions can 
be attached to the grant of amnesty. By documenting the use of conditional and 
unconditional amnesties across different contexts, we can see how different types of 
conditions may be used at different moments in the move from conflict to peace. Section 
6 draws on case study examples to explore in greater depth what this might mean for 
the extent to which a peace process is inclusive. This data explored in this section also 
demonstrates that the number of amnesties that are granted unconditionally increases as 
a peace process progresses. Such unconditionality may be unproblematic for certain groups 
of amnesty recipients; however, for those who have been involved in more serious offences, 
conditionality is desirable to enhance the legitimacy and legality of an amnesty processes. 
It therefore may necessary to exercise vigilance over the implementation of peace 
agreement amnesty commitments or amnesties introduced in the post-conflict period.
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16
 The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability (2013) were collectively authored by an expert group 
of independent, interdisciplinary scholars and practitioners from different world regions and areas with recent 
experience of dealing with gross human rights violations. The Guidelines aim to assist those seeking to make or 
evaluate decisions on amnesties and accountability in the midst or wake of conflict or repression. The Guidelines are 
available in multiple languages at https://www.ulster.ac.uk/research/institutes/transitional-justice-institute/research/
current-projects/belfast-guidelines-on-amnesty-and-accountability accessed 7 October 2018.
LEGAL EFFECT DESCRIPTION
Barring new criminal 
investigations
Amnesties that prevent criminal investigations being 
launched in relation to eligible crimes/persons after 
the amnesty is granted.
Stopping ongoing 
investigations and trials
Amnesties that end criminal proceedings for eligible 
crimes/persons before a verdict has been proclaimed 
or a sentence issued.
Releasing convicted 
prisoners and sentence 
reductions
Amnesties that in addition to applying pre-conviction 
also include post-conviction legal effects including 
pardons, reduced sentences, mitigation of sentences, 
conditional suspension of the execution of sentences, 
and probation arrangements (It is not unusual for 
prisoners to be released during political negotiations 
by other mechanisms that are separate from and 
additional to amnesties).
What are the legal effects of the amnesty?
The legal effects of amnesties are an important aspect of their design and can have 
profound implications on the extent to which amnesties promote inclusive political 
settlements. However, this issue has largely been ignored in existing scholarship. Indeed, as 
explored in Section 2, some existing literature conflates amnesties with pardons or other 
forms of post-conviction sentence releases. The ACPA dataset uses the categories of legal 
effects that are identified in The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability (2013),16  
which drew from existing state practice. Data is gathered on the effects listed in Table 10:
LEGAL EFFECT DESCRIPTION
Immunity from 
administrative sanctions
Amnesties that prevent criminal investigations being 
launched in relation to eligible crimes/persons after 
the amnesty is granted.
Stopping ongoing 
investigations and trials
Amnesties that contain provisions that erase criminal 
records and preclude magistrates and civil servants 
from recalling or leaving in any judicial or police file 
or other official document information relating to the 
amnestied offence.
Removing 
administrative penalties
Amnesties that overturn or end non-penal or 
disciplinary sanctions. This can include
a) restoring civil and political rights which may have  
 been suspended due to a criminal conviction
b) establishing processes that may lead to   
 the reinstatement of rights, enabling amnesty  
 beneficiaries to be reinstated or integrated into  
 government jobs or the armed forces; restoring  
 pensions; commitments that provide refugees  
 with a legal right to re-enter the territory; and  
 commitments that would enable returning   
 refugees to enjoy their full human rights   
 or enable to access other measures to support  
 their reintegration.
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LEGAL EFFECT DESCRIPTION
Imposing administrative 
or alternative sanctions
Amnesties that
a) impose restrictions on beneficiaries’ civil and  
 political rights;
b) impose restrictions on beneficiaries’ personal  
 behaviour (eg owning weapons or consuming  
 alcohol); 
c) remove benefits to which the amnesty   
 beneficiary would authorize be entitled
 (eg pensions); 
d) state that fines that have already been paid   
 or goods that had been confiscated would not be  
 reimbursed. 
e) For draft evaders and deserters, this category  
 includes requirements to return to the armed  
 forces. 
f) statements that the amnesty does not prevent  
 disciplinary proceedings.
Barring civil liability Amnesty provisions that remove the civil liability of 
amnesty beneficiaries (In some civil law countries, 
amnesties that bar criminal proceedings may 
indirectly bar civil proceedings, where the opening of 
civil proceedings is dependent on the existence of a 
prior criminal conviction. This indirect effect of the 
amnesty is not captured in this data). 
Table	10:	Legal	effects	of	amnesties
Figure 17 shows the number of amnesties that offer each of these legal effects.
To be included in the ACPA dataset (and the wider Amnesty Law Database), an amnesty’s 
legal effects must include barring new criminal investigations and/or closing ongoing 
investigations before a verdict is reached. As a result, these forms of legal effects are the 
most frequently occurring in the sample. However, Figure 17 shows that in addition to 
these core characteristics, amnesties can have a wide range of additional legal effects.
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Figure	17:	Legal	effects	of	amnesties	for	conflict	and	peace
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Table 11 illustrates the frequency with which different legal effects are included in 
amnesties in different contexts:
Barring new 
criminal 
investigations
Stopping 
ongoing trials
Conflict, no 
negotiations
(n=126)
Pre-
negotiation
(n=19)
Mid-
negotiations
(n=43)
Comprehensive 
Agreement
(n=70)
Post-
Agreement
(n=28)
UN /
occupier
(n=3)
90 (71%)
64 (51%)
13 (68%)
16 (84%)
25 (58%)
32 (74%)
56 (80%)
54 (77%)
17 (61%)
24 (86%)
1 (33%)
1 (33%)
Releasing 
convicted 
prisoners
47 (37%) 7 (37%) 24 (56%) 42 (60%) 16 (57%) 0
Immunity from 
administrative 
sanctions
28 (22%) 0 0 5 (7%) 2 (7%) 0
Removing 
administrative 
sanctions
8 (6%) 4 (21%) 4 (9%) 8 (11%) 3 (11%) 0
Imposing 
administrative 
or alternative 
sanctions
7 (6%) 0 9 (21%) 5 (7%) 3 (11%) 0
Prevents civil 
remedies
3 (2%) 2 (11%) 1 (2%) 4 (6%) 5 (7%) 1 (33%)
Table	11:	Legal	effects	by	context	(1990-2016
Expunging 
criminal 
records
9 (7%) 1 (5%) 4 (9%) 7 (10%) 5 (17%) 0
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This table illustrates that the legal effects of amnesties tend to become more generous 
to amnesty beneficiaries in the later stages of the negotiations and peace process. This is 
particularly apparent in the rise in the proportion of amnesties that provide for prisoner 
releases and sentence reductions after the pre-negotiation phase. This incremental growth 
in generosity could be due to multiple factors, including state unwillingness to appear 
weak while conflict is ongoing, or a growth in trust between the parties as the negotiations 
develop, or that the prize of a comprehensive peace package induces greater state 
concessions. It is unsurprising that in the post-conflict period, stopping ongoing trials is the 
most common legal effect of an amnesty given that it is the onset or expansion of criminal 
trials at these points that most often triggers amnesties in these contexts. Amnesties that 
expunge criminal records are also most prevalent in the post-conflict period; this could 
reflect that during this period, the ways in which criminal records can create barriers to 
integration become more visible and contested.
At first glance, the trend of generosity increasing in the later stages of the peace process 
would appear to conflict with the finding that amnesties most commonly offer immunity 
for administrative sanctions (which is interpreted as a generous legal effect) during ongoing 
conflicts. However, this legal effect predominantly relates to amnesties for draft evaders 
and deserters. As such, it does not demonstrate generosity towards persons who are 
alleged to have committed serious violations. Finally, amnesties that impose administrative 
sanctions on beneficiaries are intended to be more punitive. These occur at lower rates and 
peak during the mid-negotiation period – of the nine amnesties that impose administrative 
sanctions during mid-negotiation period, three are of draft evasion and desertion and three 
are for international crimes. In addition, two are for state actors and eight are for non-state 
armed groups.
Section 5 analyzes how these legal effects can shape the inclusive nature of political 
settlements.
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Part V: 
Amnesties and Inclusive 
Political Settlements
In recent years, an ‘inclusion norm’ has developed as a political and legal norm, and as a 
pragmatic necessity that political settlements be inclusive. The norm reflects a growing 
consensus among scholars and practitioners that although elite pacts are crucial to 
achieving peace, a broader social contract is necessary to sustaining it (Department for 
International Development, 2010. In particular see objective 2: ‘Exclusionary settlements 
are more likely to lead to instability’). Thus, academic literature on political settlements 
increasingly examines horizontal ‘elite’ inclusion meaning the involvement of the 
main political and military groups who have been fighting for power in both the peace 
negotiations and in the post-agreement governance structures. However, alongside this 
is the promotion of vertical inclusion between the groups that hold power and broader 
social and marginalized groups, ‘who seek to influence decisions that affect them’ (Bell, 
2017, p. 14). Proponents of vertical inclusion seek to ensure that the main national/ethnic 
groups in society, women, and sectoral groups such as of victims and refugees/internally 
displaced people are included in determinations of how political and economic power is to 
be organized in post-conflict societies.
The inclusion norm has emerged alongside the accountability norm, which is increasingly 
understood to regulate peace negotiations and impose obligations on parties to the 
conflict to investigate, prosecute, and punish international crimes and serious human 
rights violations. The accountability norm seemingly precludes amnesty for those who are 
responsible for atrocious acts, and through calling for the imposition of criminal justice 
sanctions, it seeks to exclude perpetrators of the worst offences from participating in public 
life in the post-conflict period. However, often those who have been at the heart of the 
conflict and are most responsible for the worst violations, sit at the negotiating table and 
seek to be included in new governmental arrangements. Thus, the inclusion norm may be in 
tension with the accountability or exclusion norm.
61  //  Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements
As this section explores, the relationship of amnesties to inclusion and exclusion in political 
settlements is complex. At the most straight-forward level, amnesties that are broad in 
scope, limited in conditionality and generous in their legal effects may seek to foster 
greater inclusion in the new political settlement. In contrast, amnesties that impose more 
extensive conditions or more onerous legal effects on the beneficiaries may seek to ensure 
that specific groups of individuals are excluded from the political process. In some cases, 
these more limited amnesties may complement the accountability norm through the 
exclusion of perpetrators of international crimes and serious human rights violations from 
the amnesties’ benefits. However, design complexities may mean that a single amnesty 
law may seek to include certain groups of individuals in the political settlement, while 
simultaneously excluding others. This section draws on the data presented in Section 5 
as well as examples of state practice to show how amnesty design may contribute to 
horizontal and vertical inclusion, or conversely, exclusion.
Can amnesties foster horizontal inclusion?
Amnesties can operate to foster horizontal inclusion of political and military leaders who 
had been fighting to gain or retain power in different ways depending on the moment in 
the transition from conflict that the amnesty is introduced.
Amnesties are used less frequently during the pre-negotiation phase of peace talks, than in 
later stages. However, where they are used at this moment, they are generally intended to 
get the negotiating parties to the table. Where members of non-state armed groups may 
be at risk of being subjected to criminal justice processes if they appear in person to take 
part in talks, amnesty may be used to remove this barrier to participation. Often amnesties 
granted in this phase offer broad protection for political offences.
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For example, Article 1(1) of Angola’s 2002 Lei de Amnistia, Lei No. 4/02 provided:
 Amnesty applies to all crimes against the security of the State committed in  
 the context of the Angolan armed conflict, committed before the entry into  
 force of the present Law.
However, as indicated in Section 5, one-third of amnesties enacted in the pre-
negotiation phase exclude serious crimes. In the case of Angola’s 2002 amnesty, 
Article 1(3) excluded serious crimes committed by the military:
 Amnesty also applies to all military crimes committed before the date of   
 entry into force of the present Law, except for violent crimes that result in   
 death included in section 3 of article 18 and in section 3 of article 19 of 
 Law 4/94 of 28 January (emphasis added).
This amnesty was introduced in compliance with the Angolan Government’s 
unilateral 2002 peace plan, which stated that ‘the aim of this measure being to 
ensure the requisite legal and political guarantees for promoting and achieving the 
process of national reconciliation.’
In addition to removing the prospect of future criminal liability, ensuring that non-state 
armed groups can participate in talks may also require (a) stopping ongoing criminal 
proceedings, which happens in 84 per cent of pre-negotiation amnesties; and (b) releasing 
persons have been convicted. Where opposition leaders are imprisoned, these forms of 
amnesty may be necessary to release them so that they can engage fully in the talks.
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For example, Proclamation No. 1377 of 2007 in the Philippines granted amnesty to 
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National 
Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) and other communist rebel groups. 
Section 3(1) states
 Any member of the CPP-NPA-NDF and other communist rebel groups who 
 has committed any act or omission in pursuit of political belief, referred to in  
 Section 2, including those detained, charged or convicted for such acts 
 or omission, may file an application for amnesty (emphasis added).
The preamble to this Proclamation stated that the amnesty was ‘an integral 
component of the Government’s comprehensive peace efforts’.
Finally, South Africa’s use of Indemnity Acts in 1990 and 1992 show how amnesty and 
other immunity measures can be used incrementally as practical steps to facilitate inclusive 
dialogue, while also being a form of confidence-building measure to show the non-state 
armed groups who may be wary of the state’s intentions that the state is serious about 
the negotiations. Under these Acts, the Government used a series of Government Notices 
to gradually extend the range of criminal acts that could benefit from temporary and 
permanent indemnity. These measures applied to members of non-state armed groups 
who were operating outside of South Africa’s territory as well as those who had been 
imprisoned. These measures were important for enabling leaders of the ANC to engage in 
the political negotiations to end apartheid (Mallinder 2009a)
As negotiations progress, leaders of combatant factions may seek amnesty guarantees in 
comprehensive peace agreements to ensure they as individuals or other representatives 
of their groups can be included in post-agreement power structures. These concerns may 
be particularly pronounced for non-state armed groups that wish to transition to being a 
political party in the post-conflict period (see e.g. Campbell and Connelly, 2012). 
Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements  //  64
For these groups, demands for amnesty may spring from a recognition that if they were 
to face criminal prosecution and conviction this could obstruct engagement in formal 
political activities. For example, there may be bars under domestic law against persons 
who are accused or have been convicted of criminal offences from standing for office. 
In addition, they may be concerned that convictions for conflict-related offences or war 
crimes may harm their chances at the ballot box. An amnesty can alleviate these concerns, 
where it removes the prospect of criminal liability, erases criminal records, and/or removes 
administrative punishment such as bans on individuals participating in political activity 
or standing for elected office. Thus, in these instances, the amnesty is about removing 
obstacles to inclusion in the new political dispensation.
For example, in the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, the rebel group agreed 
to drop their demands that Aceh become independent from Indonesia in exchange 
for the opportunity to participate in the political process. To facilitate this 
transformation, Article 2 of Presidential Decree Nº 22/2005 that granted amnesty 
‘Every Person Involved in the Free Aceh Movement’ provided
(1)  By granting general amnesty, then all implications derived from the criminal law  
 upon person referred by the FIRST DICTUM were cleared.
(2)  By granting Abolition, thus all charges upon person referred by the FIRST   
 DICTUM were dropped.
(3)  By granting general amnesty and abolition, thus all social, political, economic  
 and every rights for person referred by the FIRST DICTUM were repaired.
Thus, this provision provided for the erasure of criminal records and the removal any 
impingement of political and other rights that had applied to persons benefitting 
from the amnesty.
Can amnesties foster vertical inclusion?
When it comes to the inclusion of non-state armed groups, we should not only think 
in terms of elite actors. In post-conflict societies, former combatants can become 
marginalized in different ways following the disbandment of their non-state armed 
groups or restructuring of the armed forces. In particular, intersectional theories point 
to how marginalization of former combatants may be compounded by other aspects of 
their identity as women, young people, or members of ethnic groups. As with horizontal 
inclusion, the data in this study highlights ways that amnesties can remove obstacles to 
these groups engaging in the peace process through removing criminal liability, erasing 
criminal records, providing guarantees that administrative sanctions will not be imposed or 
removing sanctions that have previously been imposed.
In addition, amnesties often remove restrictions on certain individuals working within 
public institutions.
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To illustrate there is the 1991 Mauritanian Ordonnance n. 91/025, that during 
an ongoing conflict granted amnesty to persons accused or convicted of security 
offences, including members of the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (FLAM) 
rebel group, included its legal effects the erasure of criminal records (Article 2) and 
Article 4 stated: 
 Any person who has been removed from the voters’ lists and who has benefited  
 from the amnesty may, from the moment of the promulgation of this order,  
 claim his or her registration on the lists of the electoral district where he / she  
 is entitled to exercise his / her civic rights.
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For example, the 2000 Ugandan Amnesty Act created an Amnesty Commission that 
was tasked with overseeing the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 
rebel fighters who surrendered under the amnesty programme. This commission 
created a DDR programme, under which ex-combatants who were identified by 
the commission as eligible for assistance were given reinsertion packages. It was 
intended that each package would include cash and physical items such as a 
mattress, blanket, cup, pots and pans, jerry can, ten kilograms of seeds, and farming 
tools. The commission was also tasked with promoting community sensitization 
towards returning combatants and reconciliation, which it did through distributing 
materials, organizing community meetings, workshops and cultural events, and 
promoting community reconciliation rituals (Mallinder, 2009b).
In addition to legal obstacles to inclusion, for some post-conflict societies, former 
combatants may face social and cultural obstacles that inhibit their reintegration into their 
own community and their acceptance within society by other communities. Where such 
obstacles exist, they can undermine inclusion by imposing political costs for elite actors 
in engaging with these groups. An amnesty could help to foster reintegration where it is 
conditioned on offenders contributing to reconciliation through participation in transitional 
justice programmes.
For example, in Timor-Leste, UNTAET Regulation 2001/10, which established of 
the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation created a Community 
Reconciliation Process (CRP), which could recommend amnesty for less serious 
offences provided that the amnesty applicant complied with the following provisions:
 The Commission may undertake a Community Reconciliation Process only   
 in cases where a person has made an admission of responsibility based on a 
 full appreciation of the nature and consequences of such admission and has 
 voluntarily requested to participate in a Community Reconciliation Process  
 (Section 22.4, emphasis added)
Under Section 23.1, the person requesting to participate in the Community 
Reconciliation Process is required to submit a written statement describing and 
admitting responsibility for their acts, explaining how these acts were connected to 
the political conflicts in Timor Leste, and renouncing ‘the use of violence to achieve 
political objectives’.
If the truth commission determines that the person is eligible to take part in a 
CRP, provided that the person participates fully and no credible evidence of their 
involvement in serious crimes comes to light, according to Section 27.7, after the 
hearing
 the CRP Panel shall deliberate upon the act of reconciliation which it considers  
 most appropriate for the Deponent and inform the Deponent of the outcome of  
 their deliberations. The act of reconciliation may include:
 (a) community service,
 (b) reparation;
 (c) public apology; and/or
 (d) other act of contrition.
The participant in the process then has to agree in writing to undertake the act of 
reconciliation. Prosecution for the acts disclosed in the CRP will then be stayed, 
unless the person does not comply with the terms of the reconciliation agreement.
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Amnesties can also remove obstacles to inclusion of groups other than combatants. In 
particular, as recognized by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ report cited in Section 
5, they may be important to facilitate the repatriation of refugees. Refugee populations 
generally have distinctive experiences of the conflict and different needs from the post-
conflict period. Using amnesties to enable their return would make it easier to express 
these needs in an inclusive political settlement. 
Afghanistan’s 1997 Declaration of Amnesties and Invitation to Afghan Refugees to 
Repatriate, which was issued by the Supreme Court of Afghanistan during an ongoing 
conflict, provides how an amnesty law can include provisions to support the inclusion 
of returning refugees. Paragraph 2 stated that 
 No returnee shall suffer any form of harassment, discrimination, persecution or  
 any other form of punitive action on account of having fled Afghanistan and   
 having sought and found refuge in Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran or any  
 other country.
It continued in paragraph 3 by stating:
 No returnee shall be subject to harassment, intimidation, discrimination or   
 persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular  
 social group, political opinion or gender.
Paragraph 5 provided:
 In common with all other citizens, the human rights and fundamental freedoms  
 of returnees will be accorded full respect.
And paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 set out measures to support the returnees’ reintegration:
 Returnees will have access to land for settlement and agricultural use in   
 accordance with Afghanistan laws.
        [cont’d]
 All measures will be taken to facilitate, to the extent possible, the recovery and  
 restitution to the returnees of their land or other immovable property that   
 they may have lost or left behind. Failing this, returnees will be assisted to obtain  
 reparation for loss of such property.
 In order to support their reintegration, returnees will be exempted from any   
 outstanding military services or other obligatory service for the period of one  
 year. Positive consideration will be given to requests for a complete exemption  
 from military or other service obligations.
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Can amnesties result in exclusion from peace processes?
Amnesties may in some instances be intended precisely to exclude certain individuals 
or groups from post-agreement political settlements. In a similar manner to amnesty 
provisions designed to facilitate inclusion, exclusion provisions can operate in vertical 
and horizontal manners. These exclusions may reflect the balance of power between the 
negotiating parties, public opinion on including former combatants in the political life of 
the nation, or because those who are excluded are viewed as potential or actual spoilers in 
the peace process.
With respect to vertical exclusion, there are numerous examples where outgoing dictators 
have been granted some form of amnesty to smooth their departure from office, and 
occasionally from the territory of the country (Scharf, 2005; Sadat, 2006). This form of 
exclusion is not always apparent in the text of the amnesty itself but rather has to be 
inferred from trade-offs in the broader political settlement. However, the ousting of former 
Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh provides a recent example where this kind of exclusion 
deal was made explicit.
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In the Agreement of 21 Apr 2011, set out that the President would be granted 
amnesty (paragraph 3) and would then resign from office the following day 
(paragraph 4):
 On the 29th day after the Agreement enters into force, Parliament, including 
 the opposition, shall adopt laws granting immunity from legal and judicial   
 prosecution to the President and those who worked with him during his time 
 in office.
 On the 30th day after the Agreement enters into force, once Parliament, including  
 the opposition, has adopted the law on safeguards, the President of the Republic  
 shall tender his resignation to Parliament. When Parliament has accepted his  
 resignation, the Vice-President shall become the legitimate President by 
 appointment.
On 21 January 2012, Law No. 1 Of 2012 ‘Concerning the Granting of Immunity from 
Legal and Judicial Prosecution’ was adopted. Article 1 provided ‘Brother Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, President of the Republic, shall hereby be granted complete immunity from 
legal and judicial prosecution’. Article 2 granted public officials amnesty for political-
motivated acts carried out in the course of their official duties. Acts of terrorism were 
explicitly excluded from the scope of the amnesty for public officials. The law did not 
contain any provision for revoking the amnesty if outgoing President tried to exercise 
political power or if the other beneficiaries engaged in recidivism.
Amnesties themselves may contain exclusions which then impact on who they include. 
All amnesties are intended to only apply to certain individuals or groups of persons. 
However, explicit exclusions are written into the text of some amnesties, which specify 
that the protection from criminal liability does not apply to certain individuals or groups, 
or persons responsible for certain forms of crimes. Exclusions of this type are generally 
intended to ensure that those responsible for serious offences or offences that are 
unrelated to the conflict remain liable for prosecution. As such, they can shape inclusion 
and exclusion in the political settlement. 
With respect to vertical exclusion, amnesty laws sometimes contain provisions to limit 
the personnel scope of amnesties to exclude leaders of rebel groups or high-ranking 
public officials:
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For example, Article 6 of Cambodia’s 1994 Loi Relative à la mise hors-la-loi de la 
clique du Kampuchéa Démocratique, Loi Nº 064 stated:  
 For leaders of the “Democratic Kampuchea” group the stay [on prosecutions]  
 described above [in Article 5] does not apply.
Similarly, Article 4 of the Republic of Congo’s Law No. 21-99 states
 Amnesty may not be granted to authors of war crimes who, by abuse of power  
 arising out of the exercise of high political office of the State or party leader or  
 by abuse of authority or by any other means, have of the sums of money used  
 for the outbreak of the civil wars of 3 November 1993, 5 June 1997 and 18  
  December 1998, or the prosecution thereof.
Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements  //  72
Where an amnesty offers the possibility of horizontal inclusion to amnesty beneficiaries, 
conditions on non-recidivism can raise the prospect of exclusion for those who engage in 
violence and criminality after receiving the amnesty. In such instances, where individuals 
fail to commit to the peace and adhere to non-recidivism conditions, the terms of an 
amnesty can be used to re-impose criminal liability and hence contribute to their exclusion 
from the political settlement.
To demonstrate, Article 5 of the Central African Republic’s 2008 Loi No. 08.020 
portant amnistie générale à l’endroit des personnalités, des militaires, des éléments 
et des responsables civils des groupes rebelles stated:
 If a subsequent offence is committed, (irrespective of the offence) the effects  
 of the present Law will be automatically wiped out in relation to the persons  
 concerned.
 In such cases, the amnestied facts will serve as a basis for possible prosecution.  
 The benefit the release by the effect of this Act, granted to persons convicted or  
 detained, will be revoked by readmission or resumption of the proceedings.
In this provision, recidivism by an amnesty beneficiary would result in the amnesty 
being removed and the resumption of criminal proceedings or the renewed 
detention of persons who had been released from imprisonment by the amnesty.
A further example can be found in Article 5 of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s 
2014 Loi No. 14/006 portant amnistie pour faits insurrectionnels, faits de guerre et 
infractions politiques, which provided
 
 Any violation of this commitment [to renounce and refrain from    
 insurrectionary acts and acts of war] will automatically void the amnesty 
 granted and thus disqualify the author of the violation of the benefit of any  
 subsequent amnesty.
        [cont’d]
This provision also voids the amnesty but it also disqualifies the person who 
engaged in the recidivism from benefiting from any future amnesty.
In other cases, the amnesty-related penalties for recidivism are time-limited. For 
example, Article 3 of Libya’s 2012 Law No. 35 On the Amnesty of Particular Crimes 
provided
 Amnesty granted by the provisions of this law shall be revoked if the 
 amnestied persons commit an intentional offence within five years from the  
 date of entry into force of this law. In this case, such persons shall be sent back  
 to prison to serve their sentences or the remainder thereof in the case of 
 convicts. Criminal procedures shall be resumed against persons whose criminal  
 actions have been dropped in accordance with the provisions of this law,   
 provided that this is published in the media.
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The data in the ACPA sample also indicates that some amnesties are used to impose 
administrative sanctions on amnesty beneficiaries. These sanctions can include imposing 
restrictions on political activity or eligibility for public office. As these forms of measures 
would limit the ability of the amnesty beneficiaries to engage in the political settlement, 
they too can be interpreted as a form of exclusion.
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For example, Article 5 of Algeria’s 1999 Loi no 99-08 relative au rétablissement de 
la Concorde civile stipulated that amnesty beneficiaries were 
 deprived in all cases of the rights envisaged in Article 8 (2n) of the Penal   
 Code, during 10 years starting on the date of the decision of exoneration from  
 prosecution.
Article 8(2) of the then Penal Code related to the ‘deprivation of the right to be 
an elector or elector and, in general, of all civil and political rights and the right to 
wear any decoration’. Consequently, Article 5 of the amnesty meant that amnesty 
beneficiaries were denied the right to vote, to stand for election, or exercise other 
civil and political rights for a period of ten years.
This restriction was repealed in Algeria’s 2006 Ordonnance no 06-01, which granted 
a further amnesty to those who had been engaged in Algeria’s civil war. However, 
Article 26 of Ordonnance no 06-01 which was outlined in a section entitled 
‘Measures to Prevent a Repetition of the National Tragedy’ provided that
 The exercise of political activity is prohibited in any form whatsoever, for any  
 person responsible for the use of religion that led to the national tragedy.
It continued by stating that
 the exercise of political activity is also prohibited for anyone who participated  
 in terrorist actions and who, despite the damages committed by terrorist and  
 the instrumentalisation of religion for criminal purposes, refuses to recognize  
 their responsibility in the design and implementation of a policy advocating  
 violence against the nation and state institutions.
In sum, the types of amnesties reviewed in this section can clearly operate to exclude 
amnesty beneficiaries from post-agreement political structures. In some cases, explicit 
exclusions for specific individuals and groups apply automatically when the amnesty 
enters into effect. In other instances, they are dependent on the amnesty beneficiaries’ 
behaviour after they have received the benefits of the amnesty. In this way, the threat of 
exclusionary provisions (and the re-imposition of criminal proceedings or punishment) can 
be designed to ensure amnesty beneficiaries engage with the peace processes, rather than 
acting as spoilers. Exclusionary provisions are in some cases permanent, whereas in other 
instances, they operate only for a defined period of time, which can be sequenced into 
other milestones within the peace process. This can help to remove potential spoilers from 
political life until the new political structures have become consolidated.
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Amnesties have long been a widely used response to armed conflict. At different points 
during ongoing conflict, peace negotiations, and post-conflict, amnesties can be used for 
diverse and sometimes contradictory objectives. Amnesties can be intended to strengthen 
a state’s military position or to acknowledge that neither side can win militarily; to create 
impunity for serious violations or to remedy harms experienced by marginalized persons; 
to remove obstacles to insurgents taking part in the post-conflict political settlement or to 
remove potential spoilers from political life. Despite their prevalence however, as of yet we 
know very little about what makes an amnesty work and the circumstances under which 
an amnesty can contribute positively to sustainable peace.
Over the last decade, a number of empirical studies have carried out large-N comparative 
analyses to measure the impact of amnesties on peace. There is a consensus in the resulting 
literature that where amnesties are tied to peace negotiations and agreements, they can 
have a positive impact on peace. However, there are disputes in the literature over whether 
these findings apply to amnesties in general, or whether they only apply to amnesties 
enacted in authoritarian contexts or amnesties that exclude serious violations. In addition, 
existing research has largely understood peace to mean the absence of violence. 
Consequently, in measuring the impact of amnesties on peace, existing studies have 
considered whether there was a reduction in the intensity of violence, whether a peace 
agreement was signed, and/or whether the peace endured for a specific number of years. 
Existing research has largely failed to grapple with the complexity of amnesty design to 
interrogate how an amnesty fits within the broader trade-offs of political negotiations 
and the extent to which amnesty can contribute to developing an inclusive political 
settlement. This report has argued that there is considerable diversity in amnesty design, 
which can shape the extent to which an amnesty fosters an inclusive or exclusive peace. 
Further research is needed to develop more robust ways of measuring the impact of 
amnesties that takes differences in amnesty design into account. In addition, further 
research and policy development on amnesties should take a holistic view, that looks 
beyond which crimes are covered in an amnesty to take into account a wider range of 
design features, in determining which amnesties are permissible and desirable.
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